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ABSTRACT  
 
While credit rating agencies use both forward-looking and historical information 
in evaluating a firm’s credit risk, the role of forward-looking information in their rating 
decisions is not well understood. In this study, I examine the association between 
management earnings guidance news and future credit rating changes. While upward 
earnings guidance is not informative for credit rating changes, downward earnings 
guidance is significantly and positively associated with both the likelihood and speed of 
rating downgrades. In cross-sectional analyses, I find that downward guidance is 
especially informative in two important circumstances: (i) when a firm’s current credit 
rating is overly optimistic compared to a model predicted rating, and (ii) when the 
relevance or reliability of alternative information sources is lower. In addition, I find that 
downward guidance is associated with lower future cash flows, as well as a higher 
volatility of future cash flows. Overall, the results are consistent with credit rating 
agencies incorporating voluntary bad news disclosures into their decisions about whether 
and when to downgrade a firm. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate credit ratings represent the judgment of credit analysts on a firm’s 
capacity to meet its financial obligations. As credit ratings capture a significant aspect of 
credit risk, academics in the fields of accounting and finance have actively studied the 
determinants of credit ratings since at least the work of Horrigan (1966). Despite the fact 
that credit ratings are designed to be forward-looking, existing studies on credit rating 
estimation and prediction focus almost exclusively on historical accounting and stock 
market data; consequently, the relevance of forward-looking information for credit rating 
analysis is not well understood.1 Nevertheless, publicly available management earnings 
guidance provides a unique opportunity to examine the role of voluntarily disclosed 
forward-looking information on credit ratings, especially since earnings guidance is 
sometimes mentioned in the research reports and rating rationales of credit rating 
agencies (CRAs).2   
Understanding the role of voluntarily disclosed forward-looking information on 
credit ratings is potentially important for investors and other credit rating users. 
Especially, in recent years investors have often criticized CRAs for issuing untimely and 
biased credit ratings, yet both equity and debt market investors still perceive credit rating 
downgrades to be informative and react strongly to such rating changes (Micu et al. 2006, 
                                                 
1 One plausible reason for such an omission is the unavailability of forward-looking data because it is, for 
the most part, privately communicated to credit rating agencies by managers. 
2 As an example, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) cut the long-term credit rating of Nokia from BB+ to BB- on 
August 15, 2012, noting that the company’s Q3 earnings guidance was worse than expected. As another 
example, S&P downgraded Toyota’s long-term credit rating from AA+ to AA on May 8, 2009, following 
the company’s announcement of weak annual earnings guidance. 
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Chava et al. 2012).  As such, by understanding the implications of managers’ voluntary 
disclosures for credit ratings, credit rating users could better anticipate future rating 
changes and take prompt actions, given that CRAs are known to gradually incorporate 
information into credit ratings (Cheng and Neamtiu 2009). 
Although prior literature has studied how management guidance impacts the 
credit default swap (CDS) spread (Shivakumar et al. 2011), little is known about how 
guidance affects CRAs’ rating decisions. What is known about CDS spreads may not 
generalize to corporate credit ratings because such ratings are designed to measure 
relative credit risk over long-investment horizons, prompting CRAs to place less weight 
on the short-term indicators of credit quality. Furthermore, unlike the CDS market, CRAs 
usually do not respond to new information immediately in order to achieve rating 
stability (Altman and Rijken 2004, Cheng and Neamtiu 2009). To better understand 
whether and how CRAs utilize voluntary earnings guidance, I investigate the 
informativeness of earnings guidance news for the likelihood and timeliness of credit 
rating changes, explore several conditions under which earnings guidance news may be 
of enhanced importance, and shed light on the nature of the information found in earnings 
guidance. 
Using a sample of quarterly management earnings guidance from 1995-2010, I 
model a firm’s future credit rating change as a function of management guidance news 
and changes in firm fundamentals that capture financial risk and the information 
environment (e.g., Kaplan and Urwitz 1979, Ziebart and Reiter 1992, Francis et al. 2005, 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006, Barth et al. 2008, Cheng and Subramanyam 2008). In 
particular, I measure a firm’s credit rating change over various future time horizons, 
  3 
specifically from the guidance issuance date to the end of the guidance quarter or each of 
the subsequent three quarters, allowing an observation of CRAs’ rating actions over 
time.3  To provide further evidence on the relevance of earnings guidance for credit 
ratings, I also examine whether guidance news is associated with the timeliness of future 
credit rating changes, where timeliness is measured as the number of months between the 
guidance issuance date and the next credit rating change.   
The findings of this study are as follows. First, I find a significant and positive 
relation between earnings guidance news and a firm’s credit rating changes in the three 
quarters following the guidance issuance, but not in the guidance quarter. In addition, the 
economic significance of guidance news increases over the subsequent three quarters, 
suggesting that CRAs respond to some management guidance news with a delay. 
Regarding the timeliness of future credit rating changes, I find that guidance news is 
associated with the timeliness of future credit rating downgrades, but not upgrades. 
Importantly, these results pertain only to downward earnings guidance, consistent with 
such guidance being more useful due to the asymmetric payoff function of creditors 
(Shivakumar et al. 2011) and/or more credible due to managers’ tendency to withhold 
bad news (Kothari et al. 2009). Overall, the results are consistent with CRAs 
                                                 
3 In a rating agencies survey prepared by the Association for Financial Professionals, about half of the 
surveyed respondents (from companies that experienced a downgrade) report that it took CRAs between 
one and six months to incorporate deteriorations in the firm’s financials into the rating changes; about one-
fourth of the respondents report that a downgrade took place more than six months after the deterioration in 
the firm’s financials. 
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incorporating the information contained in bad news earnings guidance into their 
decisions about whether and when to downgrade a rating.4   
Next, the informativeness of downward earnings guidance about CRA actions 
depends on the magnitude of the deviation between a firm’s actual credit rating and 
expected rating.5  Prior literature indicates that CRAs usually do not change credit ratings 
in response to temporary deviations between actual and expected ratings in order to 
maintain the rating stability (Altman and Rijken 2004). However, when management 
guidance sends out a signal that is inconsistent with the current rating deviation being 
temporary (e.g., when a firm with a currently overoptimistic credit rating voluntarily 
discloses bad news), CRAs may be prompted to make a rating change in the direction of 
the expected rating in order to maintain a reputation for rating accuracy. Consistent with 
this conjecture, I find that downward guidance is more informative about the likelihood 
of future credit rating downgrades when a firm’s current rating is more optimistic than 
the expected rating. In addition, this association is stronger when the two ratings straddle 
the investment-grade cutoff (i.e., the actual rating is BBB- or higher while the expected 
rating is BB+ or lower). Consistent with this reasoning, downward guidance is also 
associated with timelier downgrades under these two conditions.  
                                                 
4 An alternative explanation is that CRAs are responding independently to the same news (e.g., 
macroeconomic, industry, or other firm-level news) that is prompting the earnings guidance news. To 
eliminate this alternative explanation, in addition to controlling for the changes in firm fundamentals, I use 
the calendar quarter fixed effects to control for the contemporaneous macroeconomic news in all empirical 
analyses. The inferences of the study are also robust to alternative specifications (untabulated) that control 
for (1) industry-quarter fixed effects as proxies for industry-level news, (2) seasonally-adjusted changes in 
ROA and earnings surprises in the current and subsequent three quarters as proxies for actual earnings 
news, and (3) stock market reaction around earnings guidance and buy-and-hold stock returns over the 
current and subsequent three quarters as proxies for contemporaneous news. 
5 Specifically, I estimate a credit rating model similar to that of Cheng and Subramanyam (2008) using 
ordered-logit regression. Then, I measure the expected ratings as the rating category with the highest fitted 
probability from the estimation. Appendix B presents the model specification and estimation results. 
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CRAs have many competing information sources at their disposal, including 
financial statements and analyst research. I conjecture that management guidance will be 
especially relevant for CRAs when the relevance or reliability of these alternative sources 
for credit risk evaluation is lower. Consistent with this conjecture, I find that downward 
guidance is more informative about the likelihood of future credit rating downgrades and 
is associated with timelier downgrades following a decrease in a firm’s financial 
reporting transparency (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006, Gu 2007, Cheng and 
Subramanyam 2008, Barth et al. 2013), or an increase in intangible intensity (e.g., Lev 
and Zarowin 1999). Similarly, I find that downward guidance is more informative about 
the likelihood of future credit rating changes following a decrease in analyst coverage, a 
proxy for the availability and reliability of financial analyst research in evaluating a 
firm’s credit risk. Overall, voluntary bad news disclosures appear to play a more 
prominent role in CRAs’ rating decisions when the relevance or reliability of these 
alternative information sources is lower. 
Finally, while the above findings reveal the importance of earnings guidance for 
future rating changes, it is not clear what kind of information about credit risk is 
conveyed by the earnings guidance. To investigate this issue, I consider both the level 
and volatility of future cash flows. My results show that negative earnings guidance news 
is associated with lower future cash flows as well as a higher volatility of future cash 
flows. Interestingly, the upward guidance does not bear this same relation with future 
cash flows. These results provide not only direct support for the relevance of downward 
guidance for credit risk evaluation, but also some explanation as to why downward 
guidance is more informative than upward guidance with respect to future CRA actions.  
  6 
The findings of this study make several contributions to the literature. First, I 
provide systematic evidence consistent with CRAs incorporating downward earnings 
guidance into their long-term credit opinions. This evidence further supports the 
importance of voluntary earnings disclosures for the debt market. Importantly, while 
prior literature provides descriptive evidence that analyst earnings forecast revisions 
contain some information about future credit rating changes (Ederington and Goh 1998) 6, 
there are reasons to believe that management guidance, if available, is a more relevant 
source of forward-looking information.7  To the best of my knowledge, this is the first 
study to document the association between voluntarily disclosed forward-looking 
information and future CRA actions. 
Second, the findings have practical implications for practitioners, especially credit 
rating users. In particular, downward earnings guidance appears to be a leading indicator 
of future credit rating downgrades. In this regard, the results of the cross-sectional 
analyses may be especially useful for credit rating users to address the lack of timeliness 
of credit ratings and anticipate possible credit rating downgrades, which are often 
                                                 
6 Specifically, Ederington and Goh (1998) find that downgrades are preceded by declines in consensus 
analyst forecasts and that consensus analyst forecasts continue to decline after downgrades. The latter result 
suggests that analyst earnings forecasts contain incomplete information about the upcoming credit rating 
downgrades. 
7 Some of the reasons are as follows. First, CRAs sometimes mention management earnings guidance in 
their rating rationales and research reports. Second, CRAs are allowed to interact with a firm’s management 
and use the private information received directly from managers as inputs to credit analysts’ models 
(Standard & Poor’s 2012b), at least in the pre-Dodd-Frank period. In terms of the impact of Dodd-Frank 
Act, I expect the publicly available earnings guidance to be an even more important information source for 
CRAs in the post-Dodd-Frank period, where CRAs are no longer exempted from Reg FD. Third, in contrast 
to financial analysts who are commonly viewed as industry specialists, managers are firm specialists and 
are expected to have more precise private information about the firms’ future cash flows and credit risk 
(Hutton et al. 2012, Brown et al. 2015). Finally, management earnings guidance news, defined as forecast 
revision from prior analyst consensus, may be estimated with greater accuracy relative to analyst earnings 
forecast news. This is because analysts tend to systematically revise their forecasts downward throughout 
the fiscal period, making it challenging to identify the true earnings news. 
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accompanied by economically significant debt and equity market reactions (e.g., Hand et 
al. 1992, Goh and Ederinton 1993, Micu et al. 2006, Chava et al. 2012).  
Finally, the findings contribute to the management guidance literature by showing 
that managers’ downward guidance may have negative credit rating consequences. 
Although downward earnings guidance can be a useful tool for expectation management 
(Cotter et al. 2006) and litigation risk management (Skinner 1994), managers need to 
consider the potential credit rating impact of their voluntary bad news disclosures. In 
addition, the generally insignificant results for upward guidance suggest that managers 
are unlikely to achieve better credit ratings by issuing upward-biased short-term earnings 
guidance. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Management Earnings Guidance and Credit Rating Agency Actions 
CRAs are specialized professional institutions that analyze and evaluate the 
creditworthiness of countries, companies, and various debt instruments, and their credit 
ratings are extensively used by capital market participants and regulators. While CRAs 
claim to use both forward-looking and historical information in evaluating a firm’s credit 
risk (Standard & Poor’s 2012a), how forward-looking information affects their rating 
decisions is not well understood. Nevertheless, publicly available management earnings 
guidance provides a unique opportunity to examine this issue, especially since earnings 
guidance is sometimes mentioned in CRAs’ rating rationales. 
It is well documented that management guidance contains value-relevant 
information for equity investors and analysts (e.g., Patell 1976, Penman 1980, Waymire 
1984, Cotter et al. 2006, Feng and McVay 2010). More recently, Shivakumar et al. (2011) 
document the CDS market’s response via changes in CDS spreads to management 
guidance, further suggesting the relevance of guidance news for credit risk evaluation. 
However, in contrast to the CDS market that timely incorporates relevant information 
into CDS spreads, CRAs are known to gradually incorporate information into credit 
ratings (Cheng and Neamtiu 2009). In addition, since corporate credit ratings are aimed 
to capture long-term and relative credit risk, such ratings are more sensitive to the long-
term than short-term indicators of credit risk (Altman and Rijken 2004). As such, the 
relation between management guidance and credit ratings is ultimately an empirical 
question. 
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Suppose CRAs incorporate the information contained in management earnings 
guidance into their rating decisions, the relevance of downward and upward earnings 
guidance are likely to differ. On one hand, CRAs may be prompted to respond more 
strongly to negative earnings news due to the asymmetric upside and downside potentials 
for lenders and debt investors (Callen et al. 2009, Easton et al. 2009, Shivakumar et al. 
2011, DeFond and Zhang 2014). On the other hand, downward earnings guidance may be 
viewed as more credible and useful by CRAs, given that managers tend to withhold bad 
news but reveal good news quickly (Kothari et al. 2009). Based on these literatures, if 
management guidance is associated with CRA actions, then such an association is 
expected to be stronger for downward guidance. 
Does the Deviation between Acual and Expected Credit Ratings Affect the Relevance 
of Management Earnings Guidance? 
At least since the bankruptcy of Enron, who is still assigned an investment-grade 
rating on the day before bankruptcy, CRAs have been repeatedly accused of issuing 
untimely and biased credit ratings (Cheng and Neamtiu 2009). Obviously, credit ratings 
do not always coincide with the market perception of credit quality, which may be 
proxied by the expected ratings derived from a credit rating estimation model. Part of this 
can be attributed to CRAs’ long-term focus, which prevents CRAs from correcting for 
temporary deviations between a firm’s credit rating and the expected rating (Altman and 
Rijken 2004). However, when management guidance sends out a signal that is 
inconsistent with the current rating deviation, the model predicted rating is not likely to 
converge to the actual rating at least in the short run; as a result, CRAs may be prompted 
to make a rating change in the direction of the expected rating. If this is the case, bad 
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news earnings guidance would be especially likely to trigger a rating downgrade when a 
firm’s current rating is overly optimistic compared to the expected rating. 
In addition to CRAs’ long-term focus, the rating deviations may also be attributed 
to CRAs’ incentives to issue optimistic credit ratings, especially under the issuer-pay 
model (Jiang et al. 2012) and the increased competition in the credit rating industry 
(Becker and Milbourn 2011). Despite the incentives to maintain optimistic ratings for 
clients, reputational concerns could prompt CRAs to adjust the overoptimistic ratings in 
response to managers’ voluntary bad news disclosures.8 In sum, regardless of the reasons 
for the rating deviations, I hypothesize that the association between downward earnings 
guidance and future credit rating changes is stronger when a firm’s credit rating is 
currently overoptimistic. 
Does the Relevance or Reliability of Alternative Information Sources Affect the 
Relevance of Management Earnings Guidance? 
CRAs have many competing information sources at their disposal. In order to 
arrive at a rating decision, CRAs must determine how much weight should be assigned to 
each information source; as a result, the importance of one information source is 
dependent on the others. Regarding management earnings guidance, its importance is 
likely to be greater when financial statements are less useful in assessing the magnitude, 
timing, and risk of future cash flows. Following prior literature (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al. 2006, Gu 2007, Cheng and Subramanyam 2008, Barth et al. 2013), I consider the 
                                                 
8 According to a Bear Stearns & Co equity analyst in June 2007, S&P claimed that “reputation is more 
important than revenues.” Also, in a Bloomberg news article, Moody’s CEO Raymond McDaniel stated 
that “we are in a business where reputational capital is more important” (Becker and Milbourn 2011). 
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impact of a firm’s financial reporting transparency and hypothesize that the relevance of 
management guidance for credit ratings would be enhanced following a decrease in 
financial reporting transparency.9   
In addition to a firm’s overall financial reporting transparency, prior literature 
points out financial statements’ inability to communicate the value of investments in 
intangible assets and argues that more disclosure can help resolve such information 
asymmetry (Lev and Zarowin 1999, Lev 2003, Merkley 2014). In the context of credit 
ratings, if increased intangible intensity results in greater perceived uncertainty about 
future cash flows and credit risk, forward-looking earnings guidance could help mitigate 
such increased uncertainty. Therefore, I hypothesize that the relevance of management 
guidance for credit ratings would be enhanced following an increase in intangible 
intensity.  
Finally, financial analyst research may be an alternative source of forward-
looking information for CRAs. In particular, prior literature has examined the role of 
financial analysts in the debt market and found that analyst activity is negatively 
associated with a firm’s default risk, consistent with both the information and monitoring 
roles of analysts (Cheng and Subramanyam 2008, Mansi et al. 2011).10 This finding 
suggests that equity analyst research is also perceived to be relevant by debt market 
                                                 
9 Barth and Schipper (2008) define financial reporting transparency as [the extent to which financial reports 
reveal an entity’s underlying economics in a way that is readily understandable by those using the financial 
reports]. As such, financial reporting transparency is also associated with the decision usefulness of 
accounting information for CRAs. 
10 Regarding the information role, Cheng and Subramanyam (2008) and Mansi et al. (2011) document the 
association between the analyst forecast quality (proxied by forecast error, forecast dispersion, or revision 
volatility) and a firm’s credit risk (proxied by credit rating or yield spread). As for the monitoring role, 
prior studies suggest that analysts serve as external monitors to management and help reduce agency costs 
between management and investors, which would in turn increase the firm’s expected future cash flows 
(e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976, Yu 2008). 
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investors. Therefore, a decrease in analyst coverage could reduce the availability of 
analyst research and even the reliability of analyst consensus, resulting in an increase in 
the importance of management guidance. 
Overall, these discussions suggest that earnings guidance may play a more 
prominent role in CRAs’ rating decisions when the relevance or reliability of alternative 
information sources for credit rating analysis is lower. If so, the association between 
earnings guidance news and future credit rating changes is expected to be stronger under 
such a circumstance. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA SOURCE, SAMPLE SELECTION, AND KEY VARIABLES 
Sample Selection and Sample Distribution  
My sample consists of quarterly management earnings guidance issued during the 
1995-2010 period with available data for the empirical analyses. I collect Standard and 
Poor’s (S&P) long-term issuer credit ratings from the Compustat database and earnings 
guidance from the First Call Company Issued Guidance (CIG) database. I obtain the 
necessary financial statement data from the Compustat Quarterly database, stock return 
data from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) database, and analyst 
earnings forecast data from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) 
database. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the sample selection procedure. I retain quarterly 
earnings guidance issued between prior earnings announcement date and current fiscal 
quarter end; if there are multiple earnings guidance available for a firm-quarter, the first 
guidance is retained. I consider only point and range guidance because the earnings news 
for such guidance can be measured with greater accuracy. Following prior studies, I 
exclude guidance associated with firms in financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6999) or 
regulated industries (SIC codes 4900-4999).11 Finally, I require credit ratings to be 
available at the beginning of guidance quarter, and retain guidance with available data to 
estimate guidance news and calculate control variables. To ensure that earnings guidance 
                                                 
11 The inferences of the study are robust to the inclusion of these industries. 
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precedes credit rating changes, I exclude observations with a credit rating change 
between the beginning of guidance quarter and the guidance issuance date. Panel B of 
Table 1 presents the time-series distribution of the sample. The number of guidance 
ranges from 18 in 1995 to 394 in 2003, and the sample sizes by year become more stable 
after 2000. 
Key Variables  
Future credit rating change (ΔCR). The dependent variables in my main 
analyses include future credit rating change and the timeliness of credit rating change. 
Since CRAs are known to gradually incorporate new information into credit ratings, I 
measure a firm’s credit rating change (ΔCR) over various future time horizons, 
specifically from the guidance issuance date to the end of the guidance quarter or each of 
the subsequent three quarters (i.e., ΔCR over quarters q and q + τ, where q is the guidance 
quarter and τ = 0, 1, 2, or 3). Based on S&P’s long-term issuer credit ratings reported on 
Compustat, I code the AAA rating as 16, the AA+ rating as 15, …, and the B- rating as 1, 
so that a positive (negative) credit rating change indicates a rating upgrade 
(downgrade).12 
Timeliness of credit rating change (Month_ΔCR). While measuring credit 
rating changes over various future time horizons allows an observation of CRAs’ rating 
actions over time, it does not directly speak about the timeliness of such actions. In this 
regard, if earnings guidance plays a role in CRAs’ decisions about when to change a 
                                                 
12 Prior literature suggests that there is no systematic difference between major CRAs’ assigned ratings 
(e.g., Altman and Rijken 2004, Jiang et al. 2012). Therefore, although I use only S&P’s credit ratings, the 
findings of this study should also apply to other major CRAs such as Moody’s and Fitch. 
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rating, the magnitude of earnings guidance news would be associated with the timeliness 
of credit rating change (Month_ΔCR), measured as the number of rounded months 
between the guidance issuance date and the next credit rating change. More specifically, I 
define Month_DG (Month_UG) as the number of months from the guidance issuance to 
the next rating downgrade (upgrade). Accordingly, lower values of Month_DG and 
Month_UG correspond to timelier credit rating downgrades and upgrades, respectively. 
Management earnings guidance news (MF_NEWS). As the key variable of 
interest, management earnings guidance news is measured as earnings guidance minus 
pre-existing one-quarter-ahead analyst consensus forecast, deflated by the stock price at 
the beginning of prior quarter. However, for guidance bundled with earnings 
announcements, which account for approximately 44% of my sample, one-quarter-ahead 
analyst forecasts are not available. In such a case, I follow Rogers and Van Buskirk 
(2013) to estimate analysts’ conditional expectation as pre-existing two-quarter-ahead 
analyst consensus forecast adjusted for the predicted analyst forecast revision based on 
the contemporaneous earnings surprise; then, I use analysts’ conditional expectation as 
the benchmark to measure the earnings guidance news. Importantly, Rogers and Van 
Buskirk (2013) show that such a procedure is able to substantially reduce the 
measurement errors in bundled earnings guidance news.13 
Deviation between actual and expected credit ratings (DIFF). Prior literature 
documents that the deviation between a firm’s actual credit rating and expected rating is 
an important determinant of future credit rating changes (Alissa et al. 2013). 
                                                 
13 In an untabulated test, I find that the informativeness about future CRA actions is not statistically 
different for bundled and unbundled earnings guidance news.  
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Furthermore, such a rating deviation could affect CRAs’ response to new information 
(Altman and Rijken 2004). Therefore, I measure the rating deviation (DIFF) as a firm’s 
actual rating minus the predicted rating derived from the credit rating estimation model 
specified in Appendix B.14 By construction, a positive DIFF suggests that the actual 
rating is currently more optimistic than the expected rating; in contrast, a negative DIFF 
indicates that the actual rating may be overly pessimistic. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the key variables. The mean (median) 
credit rating at the beginning of guidance quarter, CRi,q-1, is 7.8135 (8), which is 
approximately a BBB rating and is comparable to prior studies (e.g., Cheng and 
Subramanyam 2008). The mean credit rating changes, ΔCRs, are negative and 
monotonically decreasing over time, indicating that there are more downgrades than 
upgrades during the sample period of 1995-2010. The mean (median) guidance news, 
MF_NEWS, is 0.0564% (0.0263%) of the stock price, and the standard deviation 
indicates that there is a substantial variation among firm-quarters. The mean rating 
deviation, DIFF, is 0.1435, suggesting firms’ actual ratings tend to be more optimistic 
than the expected ratings. Finally, based on the IG+ variable, 5.34% of the firm-quarters 
have an actual rating of investment grade yet an expected rating of non-investment grade; 
                                                 
14 In order to improve the stability of the coefficient estimates, I use a large sample of firms that have 
issued at least one quarterly earnings forecast during the sample period and that are rated B- or higher. Note 
that the latter imposed restriction is aimed to improve the precision of credit rating estimation and does not 
affect the size of the management earnings guidance sample. 
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similarly, based on the IG- variable, 7.57% of the firm-quarters have an actual rating of 
non-investment grade yet an expected rating of investment grade.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Since several independent variables are calculated based on the deviation between 
actual and expected ratings (i.e., DIFF, IG+, and IG-), I present the distribution of firm-
quarters by the combinations of actual and expected ratings in Panel A of Table 3. The 
firm-quarters on the diagonal line have a credit rating consistent with the expected rating, 
and those above (below) the diagonal line have a credit rating more optimistic 
(pessimistic) than the expected rating. Panel B of Table 3 reports the frequency by the 
magnitude of rating deviations. Approximately 70% of firm-quarters have a rating 
deviation equal to or less than one notch and 89% of firm-quarters have a rating deviation 
equal to or less than two notches.   
  18 
CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS 
Management Earnings Guidance News and Future Credit Rating Changes 
 Profile analysis. I first conduct a profile analysis for three groups of firms: (1) 
firms whose credit ratings are downgraded, (2) firms whose credit ratings do not change, 
and (3) firms whose credit ratings are upgraded in the current or subsequent three 
quarters of guidance issuance. Specifically, for each group of firms, I calculate the mean 
guidance news (MF_NEWS, expressed as a percentage of stock price) as well as the mean 
changes in firm fundamentals prior to the guidance issuance.15 Following prior studies 
(e.g., Kaplan and Urwitz 1979, Ziebart and Reiter 1992, Francis et al. 2005, Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2006, Barth et al. 2008, Cheng and Subramanyam 2008), I consider several 
financial risk measures, including return on assets (ROA), financial leverage (LEV), 
interest coverage (ICOVER), earnings volatility (STD_ROA), loss firm (LOSS), equity 
financing (ΔEQ), cash dividend payment (DV), abnormal stock return (ARET), market 
beta (BETA), stock return volatility (STD_RET), book-to-market ratio (BTM), and size 
(MV). I also consider several information environment measures, including analyst 
coverage (NANALYST), intensity of intangible assets (INTAN), absolute abnormal 
accruals (|ABACC|), and financial reporting transparency (TRANSP). Appendix A 
provides the variable definitions. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
                                                 
15 I measure the changes in firm fundamentals as the difference between quarter (q-1) and quarter (q-5), 
where q is earnings guidance quarter. To address the concern of stale information, I also measure the 
changes as the difference between quarter (q-1) and quarter (q-2), and find qualitatively similar results in 
the multivariate analyses.   
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Column 1 of Table 4 shows that credit rating downgrades are preceded by 
significantly negative earnings guidance news (mean = -0.2117, p < 0.01) as well as by 
deterioration in several financial risk and information environment proxies, with the 
exception of the decreased |ABACC|. Prior to downgrades, these firms’ actual ratings 
tend to be more optimistic than the expected ratings, as evidenced by the significantly 
positive DIFF (mean = 0.6167, p < 0.01). Interestingly, analyst earnings forecast news 
orthogonal to management guidance news (RAF_NEWS, expressed as a percentage of 
stock price) is not significantly different from zero for downgraded firms.16 By contrast, 
Column 3 of Table 4 shows that credit rating upgrades are preceded by significantly 
positive earnings guidance news (mean = 0.1403, p < 0.05) as well as by improvement in 
several financial risk and information environment proxies, with the exception of the 
increased BETA. Prior to upgrades, these firms’ actual ratings tend to be overly 
pessimistic according to the significantly negative DIFF (mean = -0.9015, p < 0.01). In 
addition, analyst earnings forecast news orthogonal to management guidance news is 
significantly positive (mean = 0.0631, p < 0.01). Finally, Column 2 of Table 4 shows that 
firms without rating changes are associated with relatively more moderate, yet still 
statistically significant, positive earnings guidance news (mean = 0.0946, p < 0.01). 
Similarly, these firms are associated with more moderate changes in the financial risk and 
information environment proxies relative to firms with credit rating changes.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
                                                 
16 Appendix C presents the model specification and estimation results for this variable. 
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Figure 1 provides additional descriptive evidence on the informativeness of 
guidance news about future credit rating changes. Specifically, for each of the four 
quarters leading up to the rating changes, I calculate the mean guidance news separately 
for downgraded and upgraded firms, where rating changes occur at the end of quarter q.17 
As a result, Figure 1 shows that downgrades are preceded by increasingly negative 
guidance news from quarters q-3 to q-1, while upgrades are preceded by moderately 
increasingly positive guidance news from quarters q-3 to q-1. Notably, the large negative 
guidance news in quarter q-1 appears to be a potentially useful signal of future 
downgrades.  
Overall, the results of both Table 4 and Figure 1 are consistent with management 
guidance news, especially negative guidance news, being a leading indicator of future 
credit rating changes. The results of Table 4 also point out the importance of controlling 
for these firm fundamentals, as guidance news may be associated with many of them (e.g., 
McNichols 1989, Lang and Lundholm 2000, Rogers and Stocken 2005, Gong et al. 2009, 
Feng and Koch 2010, Lee et al. 2012). 
Regression analysis. Prior literature finds that management guidance contains 
value-relevant information for both equity and debt investors (e.g., Patell 1976, Penman 
1980, Waymire 1984, Shivakumar et al. 2011). However, given that corporate credit 
ratings are aimed to capture long-term and relative credit risk, the impact of short-term 
management guidance on such ratings is not immediately clear. To investigate this 
question, I first examine whether guidance news is associated with the likelihood of 
                                                 
17 In order to track the earnings guidance news from the same firms over time, I consider only firms that 
had issued earnings guidance for all four quarters. Nevertheless, similar patterns can be observed when this 
restriction is removed. 
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future credit rating change, controlling for the deviation between actual and expected 
ratings as well as the changes in various firm fundamentals. Next, given the occurrence of 
credit rating changes, I examine whether guidance news is associated with the timeliness 
of such changes. Specifically, I estimate the following ordered logit (Poisson) regression 
for the likelihood (timeliness) of future credit rating changes: 
ΔCRi,q+τ            = 
(Month_ΔCR)  
α0 + α1 · MF_NEWSi,q + α2 · DIFFi,q-1 + α3 · RAF_NEWSi,q  
+ α4 · ΔNANALYSTi,q-1 + α5 · ΔROAi,q-1 + α6 · ΔLEVi,q-1  
+ α7 · ΔICOVERi,q-1 + α8 · ΔSTD_ROAi,q-1 + α9 · ΔLOSSi,q-1  
+ α10 · ΔINTANi,q-1 + α11 ·ΔΔEQi,q-1 + α12 · ΔDVi,q-1  
+ α13 · ARETi,q-1 + α14 · ΔBETAi,q-1 + α15 · ΔSTD_RETi,q-1  
+ α16 · ΔBTMi,q-1 + α17 · ΔMVi,q-1 + α18 · Δ|ABACCi,q-1|  
+ α19 · ΔTRANSPi,q-1 + Industry FE + Quarter FE + εi,q+τ   
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1)
where the variables are defined as follows. 
ΔCRi,q+τ = Change in credit rating over quarters [q, q+τ], τ = 0, 1, 2, or 3, where 
a positive (negative) change indicates credit rating upgrade 
(downgrade).  
Month_ΔCR =  Either Month_DG or Month_UG, where Month_DG is the number of 
months between management earnings guidance date and next credit 
rating downgrade, and Month_UG is the number of months between 
management earnings guidance date and next credit rating upgrade. 
MF_NEWS = Management earnings guidance news, measured as management 
earnings guidance minus prior analyst consensus for the quarter, 
scaled by beginning stock price of the previous quarter. Prior analyst 
consensus is measured as the mean of one-quarter ahead analyst 
earnings forecasts issued during [-30,-2] of management guidance; if 
missing, prior analyst consensus is replaced by the conditional 
earnings expectation for the quarter (Rogers and Van Buskirk 2013). 
DIFF =  The difference between a firm’s actual credit rating and expected 
credit rating at the beginning of guidance quarter (i.e., current rating 
- expected rating), where a positive (negative) difference suggests 
that actual rating is currently more optimistic (pessimistic) than the 
expected rating.  
RAF_NEWS = Analyst earnings forecast news orthogonal to management earnings 
guidance news, measured as the residual term from estimating 
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Equation. (C.1).  
NANALYST =  Analyst coverage, measured as the natural log of the number of 
analysts following the firm during the quarter. 
ROA =  Return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets at the end of the quarter. 
LEV =  Financial leverage, measured as long-term debt plus short-term debt, 
divided by total assets at the end of the quarter. 
ICOVER =  Interest coverage, measured as operating income before depreciation 
divided by interest expense for the quarter. 
STD_ROA =  Earnings volatility, measured as standard deviation of ROA over 
most recent 16 quarters, requiring at least 8 quarters with data 
available. 
LOSS =  An indicator variable set to one if income before extraordinary items 
is negative for the quarter, and zero otherwise. 
INTAN =  Intensity of intangibles, measured as research and development 
expense scaled by total assets at the end of the quarter. 
ΔEQ =  Equity financing, an indicator variable set to one if change in 
shareholder equity during the quarter is greater than zero, and zero 
otherwise. 
DV =  Cash dividend payment, an indicator variable set to one if the firm 
pays cash dividends during the quarter, and zero otherwise. 
ARET =  Abnormal stock return, measured as market-adjusted buy-and-hold 
return over the prior fiscal quarter. 
BETA =  Market beta, measured based on the market model using daily stock 
returns of the prior 4 quarters. 
STD_RET =  Return volatility, measured as standard deviation of monthly returns 
over the prior 4 quarters. 
BTM =  Book-to-market ratio, calculated as book value of common equity 
divided by market value of common equity at the end of the quarter. 
MV =  Firm size, measured as natural log of the market value of common 
equity at the end of the quarter. 
|ABACC| =  Absolute value of abnormal accruals, measured as the residual term 
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from estimating the following cross-sectional Jones model (DeFond 
and Jiambalvo 1994) for each 2-digit SIC industry and quarter 
group, requiring at least 10 observations for each group: 
TACCi,q/TAi,q-1 = α0 · (1/TAi,q-1) + α1 · (PPEi,q/TAi,q-1) + α2 · 
(ΔREVi,q/TAi,q-1), where TACC is total accruals, measured as income 
before extraordinary items minus operating cash flows, TA is total 
assets, PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment, and ΔREV is 
change in sales revenue. 
TRANSP =  Financial reporting transparency, measured as negative one times the 
squared residual from estimating the following cross-sectional 
regression for each 2-digit SIC industry and quarter group, requiring 
at least 10 observations for each group: ARETi,q = α0 + α1 · 
(IBi,q/MVi,q-1) + α2 · (LOSSi,q) + α3 · (LOSSi,q) * (IBi,q/MVi,q-1) + α4 · 
Δ(IBi,q/MVi,q-1), where IB is income before extraordinary items and 
other variables are as defined above (Gu 2007).  
Industry FE =  Industry indicator variables based on 2-digit SIC industry group 
classification. 
Quarter FE =  Calendar quarter indicator variables. 
 
For the test of ΔCR, if guidance news is incrementally informative about the 
occurrence of future credit rating changes, then I expect α1 > 0; for the test of 
Month_ΔCR, if guidance news is associated with the timeliness of future downgrades 
(upgrades), I expect α1 > 0 (α1 < 0) when Month_DG (Month_UG) is the dependent 
variable. Note that the coefficients are expected to have opposite signs for the test of 
Month_UG. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
Empirical results: likelihood of future credit rating changes. Table 5 presents 
the results from estimating Eq. (1). For all regressions in this study, continuous variables 
are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%, and the z-statistics or t-statistics reported in 
parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm and by quarter to address 
cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Gow et al. 2010). Focusing on the test of 
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ΔCR, I find that earnings guidance news, MF_NEWS, is significantly and positively 
associated with the credit rating changes in the three quarters following the guidance 
issuance (i.e., columns 2-4, respectively), but not in the guidance quarter (i.e., column 
1).18 Importantly, the economic significance of the MF_NEWS coefficient increases over 
time, consistent with CRAs gradually incorporating the guidance news into credit ratings.  
Turning to the control variables, the significant and negative coefficient of DIFF 
in columns 1-4 suggests that firms’ credit ratings tend to move toward the expected 
ratings. Consistent with the results of Ederington and Goh (1998), the significant and 
positive coefficient of RAF_NEWS in columns 2-4 suggests that residual analyst earnings 
forecast news is also informative about future credit rating changes. Among other control 
variables, change in financial leverage (ΔLEV), change in firm size (ΔMV), and prior 
abnormal stock return (ARET) appear to be the more important determinants of future 
credit rating changes. 
Empirical results: timeliness of future credit rating changes. For the test of 
Month_ΔCR, I utilize a sample of firms with credit rating changes within two years.19 I 
find that earnings guidance news, MF_NEWS, is significantly and positively associated 
with the timeliness of downgrades (coefficient = 0.0288, p < 0.05, in column 5), but not 
with the timeliness of upgrades (column 6). The significant and negative coefficient of 
                                                 
18 The insignificant MF_NEWS coefficient reported in column 1 helps rule out the alternative explanation 
that such earnings news is driven by the contemporaneous credit rating change. At the same time, it raises 
questions about what information is conveyed through earnings guidance. In untabulated tests, I continue to 
find a significant MF_NEWS coefficient in columns 2-4, after controlling for (1) ΔROA and earnings 
surprises in the current and/or subsequent three quarters, and (2) stock market reaction around earnings 
guidance (i.e., CAR[-1,+1]) and buy-and-hold stock returns over the current and/or subsequent three 
quarters. These results suggest that management guidance contain information beyond the actual earnings 
news and contemporaneous stock return. I formally investigate this question in section 4.4.  
 
19 The inferences are similar if this restriction is removed. 
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DIFF in column 5 (coefficient = -0.0362, p < 0.05) indicates that the current rating 
optimism is associated timelier downgrades, whereas the significant and positive 
coefficient of DIFF in column 6 (coefficient = 0.0634, p < 0.01) indicates that the current 
rating pessimism is associated timelier upgrades. 
Downward versus upward earnings guidance. The timeliness results reported 
in Table 5 suggest that negative guidance news may be more relevant than positive 
guidance news for CRAs’ rating decisions. This is not unexpected, as prior literature 
indicates that negative earnings news is more relevant to debt market investors due to 
their asymmetric upside and downside risk exposures (Callen et al. 2009, Easton et al. 
2009, Shivakumar et al. 2011, DeFond and Zhang 2014). In addition, downward 
guidance is generally viewed as more credible and useful by equity market investors and 
analysts (Cotter et al. 2006, Kothari et al. 2009, Feng and McVay 2010). To formally 
investigate this issue, I re-estimate Eq. (1) separately for the downward and upward 
earnings guidance samples. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
Panels A and B of Table 6 presents the results for the downward and upward 
guidance samples, respectively. I find that negative guidance news is significantly 
associated with both ΔCR and Month_ΔCR (more specifically Month_DG), while positive 
guidance news is not. That is, downward guidance is informative for both the likelihood 
and speed of future credit rating downgrades.20 Such asymmetric results are consistent 
                                                 
20 The fact that credit ratings are sticky, as well as the result in Figure 1 that rating downgrades are 
preceded by large negative guidance news, suggests a nonlinear relation between earnings guidance news 
and future credit rating changes. To examine this potential nonlinear effect, I focus on ΔCRi,q+3 and modify 
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with CRAs perceiving downward guidance to be more relevant than upward guidance for 
their rating decisions. Due to the generally insignificant results for the upward guidance 
sample, I will focus my subsequent analyses and discussions on the downward guidance 
sample. 
Relevance of Management Earnings Guidance News Conditional on the Deviation 
between Actual and Expected Ratings  
Magnitude of the deviation between actual and expected ratings. Next, I 
examine whether the magnitude of the deviation between a firm’s actual and expected 
credit ratings affects the association between earnings guidance news and future credit 
rating changes. Regarding downward guidance, it may be especially relevant for CRAs’ 
decisions to downgrade a firm when the current rating appears to be overly optimistic. To 
test this conjecture, I specify the following ordered logit (Poisson) regression for the 
likelihood (timeliness) of future credit rating changes: 
ΔCRi,q+τ          =  
(Month_DG)  
α0 + α1 · MF_NEWSi,q + α2 · DIFFi,q-1  
+ α3 · MF_NEWSi,q * DIFFi,q-1 + α4 · IG
+
i,q-1  
+ α5 · MF_NEWSi,q * IG
+
i,q-1 + α6 · IG
-
i,q-1  
+ α7 · MF_NEWSi,q * IG
-
i,q-1+ α8 · RAF_NEWSi,q  
+ α9 · ΔNANALYSTi,q-1 + α10 · ΔROAi,q-1 + α11 · ΔLEVi,q-1  
+ α12 · ΔICOVERi,q-1 + α13 · ΔSTD_ROAi,q-1 + α14 · ΔLOSSi,q-1  
+ α15 · ΔINTANi,q-1 + α16 ·ΔΔEQi,q-1 + α17 · ΔDVi,q-1  
+ α18 · ARETi,q-1 + α19 · ΔBETAi,q-1 + α20 · ΔSTD_RETi,q-1  
+ α21 · ΔBTMi,q-1 + α22 · ΔMVi,q-1 + α23 · Δ|ABACCi,q-1|  
+ α24 · ΔTRANSPi,q-1 + Industry FE + Quarter FE + εi,q+τ   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2)
Where the variables not previously defined are as follows. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Eq. (1) by including a LARGE_MF_NEWS variable to the model, which is an indicator variable set equal to 
1 when the absolute magnitude of earnings guidance news is greater than the sample median. As a result, 
for the downward guidance sample, both the statistical and economic significance of MF_NEWS are 
weakened (coefficient = 0.1015, p < 0.1), and the LARGE_MF_NEWS indicator is significant and negative 
(coefficient = -0.4270, p < 0.05). By contrast, both MF_NEWS and LARGE_MF_NEWS are statistically 
insignificant for the upward guidance sample. 
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IG+ =  An indicator set equal to one if the firm’s actual credit rating is 
investment grade while the expected credit rating is non-investment 
grade (i.e., current rating is more optimistic than the expected rating 
and the two ratings straddle the investment grade cutoff), and zero 
otherwise.  
IG- =  An indicator set equal to one if the firm’s current credit rating is non-
investment grade while the expected credit rating is investment grade 
(i.e., current rating is more pessimistic than the expected rating and 
the two ratings straddle the investment grade cutoff), and zero 
otherwise. 
 
I expect that downward guidance has a stronger association with both the 
likelihood and timeliness of future credit rating changes when a firm’s current credit 
rating is more optimistic than the expected rating (α3 > 0) and, especially, when the two 
ratings straddle the investment-grade cutoff (α5 > 0).   
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
Table 7 presents the results for the downward guidance sample. Focusing on the 
test of ΔCR, I find that the coefficient of MF_NEWS * DIFF is significant and positive in 
columns 2-4 and that the coefficient of MF_NEWS * IG+ is also significant and positive 
in columns 2-3. These results suggest that downward guidance is especially informative 
about the occurrence of future credit rating downgrades when a firm’s current rating is 
overly optimistic. Turning to the result of Month_DG in column 5, I find that the 
coefficients of both MF_NEWS * DIFF and MF_NEWS * IG
+ are significant and positive, 
corroborating the results of ΔCR. Interestingly, the main effect of MF_NEWS is no longer 
significant.21 Overall, downward guidance appears to be especially relevant for CRAs’ 
                                                 
21 This result implies that, when the current credit rating is consistent with the expected rating, CRAs may 
not incorporate negative guidance news into credit ratings until more clarifying information becomes 
available. Consequently, the magnitude of negative guidance news is associated with the likelihood but not 
with the timeliness of future downgrades. 
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rating decisions when it sends out a signal that is inconsistent with the current rating 
optimism. 
Persistence of the deviation between actual and expected ratings. Further, the 
interaction effect between MF_NEWS and DIFF on future credit rating changes may 
depend on the persistence of the rating deviation, defined as the time elapsed since the 
initial rating deviation had took place. In particular, if a firm’s rating deviation has been 
sustained for a long period of time, chances are that the model predicted rating is 
imprecise due to the omission of important information or that CRAs have strong 
incentives to maintain an optimistic credit opinion for the client. In either case, short-term 
earnings guidance is not likely to prompt CRAs to change the current rating toward the 
expected rating. As such, I expect the interaction effect between MF_NEWS and DIFF to 
be weaker for more persistent rating deviations. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
To test this conjecture, I re-estimate Eq. (2), excluding observations with a rating 
deviation for more than 5, 4, 3, 2, or 1 year, respectively. For the tests of both ΔCR and 
Month_DG, I find that the coefficient estimate of MF_NEWS * DIFF increases 
monotonically as more persistent rating deviations are excluded. For brevity, I only report 
the results of excluding observations with a rating deviation for more than 5 years 
(columns 2 and 5) or 1 year (columns 3 and 6), respectively. Overall, the results 
presented in Table 8 suggest that the deviation between actual and expected ratings is 
especially likely to affect CRAs’ incorporation of negative guidance news when such a 
rating deviation has occurred relatively recently. 
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Relevance of Management Earnings Guidance News Conditional on the Relevance 
or Reliability of Alternative Information Sources  
 While the results so far are consistent with CRAs incorporating negative earnings 
guidance news into their rating decisions, the relevance of earnings guidance for credit 
risk evaluation could depend on alternative, competing information sources. Specifically, 
downward guidance is likely to be more relevant when alternative information sources 
have become less useful. To test this hypothesis, I interact MF_NEWS with three 
measures that proxy for the change in relevance or reliability of alternative information 
sources (i.e., financial statements and financial analyst research) in assessing a firm’s 
future cash flows and credit risk. I expect downward earnings guidance to be more (less) 
relevant following a decrease (increase) in the reliability or reliability of an alternative 
source. Specifically, I estimate the following ordered logit (Poisson) regression for the 
likelihood (timeliness) of future credit rating changes:22 
ΔCRi,q+3           = 
(Month_ΔCR)  
α0 + α1 · MF_NEWSi,q + α2 · ΔALT_SRCSi,q-1  
+ α3 · MF_NEWSi,q * ΔALT_SRCSi,q-1 + α4 · DIFFi,q-1  
+ α5 · RAF_NEWSi,q + α6 · ΔNANALYSTi,q-1 + α7 · ΔROAi,q-1  
+ α8 · ΔLEVi,q-1 + α9 · ΔICOVERi,q-1 + α10 · ΔSTD_ROAi,q-1 
+ α11 · ΔLOSSi,q-1 + α12 · ΔINTANi,q-1 + α13 ·ΔΔEQi,q-1  
+ α14 · ΔDVi,q-1 + α15 · ARETi,q-1 + α16 · ΔBETAi,q-1  
+ α17 · ΔSTD_RETi,q-1 + α18 · ΔBTMi,q-1 + α19 · ΔMVi,q-1  
+ α20 · Δ|ABACCi,q-1| + α21 · ΔTRANSPi,q-1 + Industry FE  
+ Quarter FE + εi,q+3   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3) 
, where ΔALT_SRCS denotes (-1) * ΔTRANSP, ΔINTAN, or (-1) * ΔNANALYST. As 
previously defined, TRANSP represents financial reporting transparency and is measured 
as negative one times the squared residual from regressing returns on earnings and 
                                                 
22 For brevity, I only report the results for credit rating changes over quarters [q, q+3]. However, the 
inferences are similar when credit rating change is measured over quarters [q, q+2] (i.e., ΔCRi,q+2). 
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change in earnings, allowing for different intercepts and slopes for profit and loss firms 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006, Gu 2007, Cheng and Subramanyam 2008, Barth et al. 
2013); INTAN represents the intensity of intangible assets, and NANALYST represents 
equity analyst coverage. Note that ΔTRANSP and ΔNANALYST are multiplied by negative 
one so that positive values suggest decreased reliability of financial reports and analyst 
consensus, respectively, for credit risk evaluation. 
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
Change in financial reporting transparency. Empirically, the TRANSP measure 
is aimed to capture both the timeliness of a firm’s financial information and the relevance 
of financial information for assessing the firm’s current economic conditions (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2006). As such, if a firm’s financial reporting transparency decreases, 
historical accounting information would be less useful for credit risk assessment, and 
CRAs may be prompted to place more weight on downward earnings guidance. 
Therefore, I expect the association between downward guidance and future credit rating 
changes to be inversely related to the change in financial reporting transparency (α3 > 0, 
by construction of the corresponding ΔALT_SRCS variable).  
Columns 1 and 4 of Table 9 present the results for the downward guidance sample. 
As expected, I find the coefficient of MF_NEWS * ΔALT_SRCS to be significant and 
positive in both column 1 (α3 = 0.5156, p < 0.01) and column 4 (α3 = 0.2491, p < 0.01). 
These results suggest that, following a decrease in the firm’s financial reporting 
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transparency, downward earnings guidance is more relevant for CRAs’ decisions to 
downgrade a firm.23 
Change in intensity of intangibles. Next, I investigate whether the change in a 
firm’s intangible intensity, ΔINTAN, moderates the association between downward 
earnings guidance and future credit rating changes. Prior literature points out financial 
statements’ inability to communicate the value of investments in intangible assets and 
argues that more disclosure can help resolve the information asymmetry (Lev 2003, 
Merkley 2014). As such, CRAs’ weighting of earnings guidance could depend on a 
firm’s intangible intensity. I expect the association between of downward guidance and 
future credit rating changes to be positively related to the change in a firm’s intangible 
intensity (α3 > 0). 
Columns 2 and 5 of Table 9 present the results for the downward guidance sample. 
As expected, I find the coefficient of MF_NEWS * ΔALT_SRCS to be significant and 
positive in both column 2 (α3 = 13.9091, p < 0.01) and column 5 (α3 = 1.5040, p < 0.1). 
These results are consistent with CRAs placing more weight on downward guidance 
when a firm’s intangible intensity and the perceived uncertainty about future cash flows 
increase.24 
Change in analyst coverage. Finally, I investigate whether the change in a firm’s 
analyst coverage, ΔNANALYST, moderates the association between downward earnings 
guidance and future credit rating changes. Suppose analyst coverage is associated with 
                                                 
23 Similar inference can be made when ΔTRANSP is replaced by TRANSP (i.e., the level specification). 
Nevertheless, the change specification is potentially more interesting because it jointly examines whether 
CRAs dynamically adjust the weights placed on different information sources. 
24 Similar inference can be made when ΔINTAN is replaced by INTAN in the empirical analysis. 
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both the availability of analyst research and the reliability of analyst consensus, a change 
in analyst coverage could affect the usefulness of analyst research in evaluating a firm’s 
credit risk. As a response to such a change, CRAs are likely to adjust the weight placed 
on management guidance. I therefore expect the association between of downward 
guidance and future credit rating changes to be inversely related to the change in analyst 
coverage (α3 > 0, by construction of the corresponding ΔALT_SRCS variable). 
Columns 3 and 6 of Table 9 present the results for the downward guidance sample. 
I find the coefficient of MF_NEWS * ΔALT_SRCS to be significant and positive in 
column 3 (α3 = 0.2447, p < 0.05), but statistically insignificant in column 6. The former 
result is consistent with CRAs placing more weight on downward guidance when the 
information asymmetry increases due to a drop in analyst coverage. 
Management Earnings Guidance News and Future Cash Flows Properties 
While the significant equity and debt market reactions to management guidance 
news suggest that management guidance contains relevant information about a firm’s 
future cash flows and credit risk, it is not clear what kind of cash flows information is 
conveyed through management guidance. To further support the relevance of 
management guidance for credit rating analysis, I specify the following OLS regression 
to examine the relations between guidance news and two future cash flows properties, 
specifically the level and the volatility of future cash flows: 
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CFOi,[q, q+3]   = α0  + α1 · MF_NEWSi,q + α2 · CFOi,[q-4, q-1] + α3 · DIFFi,q-1  
+ α4 · RAF_NEWSi,q + α4 · CFOi,[q-4, q-1]  
+ α5 · ΔNANALYSTi,q-1 + α6 · ΔROAi,q-1 + α7 · ΔLEVi,q-1  
+ α8 · ΔICOVERi,q-1 + α9 · ΔSTD_ROAi,q-1+ α10 · ΔLOSSi,q-1  
+ α11 · ΔINTANi,q-1 + α12 ·Δ ΔEQi,q-1 + α13 · ΔDVi,q-1  
+ α14 · ARETi,q-1 + α15 · ΔBETAi,q-1 + α16 · ΔSTD_RETi,q-1  
+ α17 · ΔBTMi,q-1 + α18 · ΔMVi,q-1 + α19 · Δ|ABACCi,q-1|  
+ α20 · ΔTRANSPi,q-1 + Industry FE + Quarter FE + εi   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4) 
Where CFOi,[q, q+3] denotes either AVG_CFOi,[q, q+3] or STD_CFOi,[q, q+3], as defined 
below. 
AVG_CFOi,[q, q+3] =  The level of future cash flows, measured as the mean of 
(operating cash flows/beginning total assets) over quarters  
[q, q+3]. 
STD_CFOi,[q, q+3] =  The volatility of future cash flows, measured as |standard 
deviation of operating cash flows/mean of operating cash flows| 
over quarters [q, q+3], where operating cash flows are scaled by 
beginning total assets. 
 
If management guidance is informative about future cash flows beyond the 
guidance quarter, I expect guidance news to be positively associated with the level of 
future cash flows (α1 > 0) and/or negatively associated with the volatility of future cash 
flows (α1 < 0). 
[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE] 
Table 10 presents the results for the downward guidance sample (columns 1-2) 
and the upward guidance sample (columns 3-4), respectively. Focusing on the downward 
guidance sample, I find that the coefficient of MF_NEWS is significantly positive in 
column 1 (α1 = 0.0009, p < 0.05) and significantly negative in column 2 (α1 = -0.0917, p 
< 0.1), indicating that downward guidance is associated with lower future cash flows as 
well as a higher volatility of future cash flows. These results also suggest that the 
information content of downward guidance about future cash flows extends beyond the 
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guidance quarter. Perhaps surprisingly, I do not find a statistically significant association 
between upward guidance and future cash flows properties. In sum, these asymmetric 
results offer some explanation as to why downward guidance is more informative than 
upward guidance about future CRA actions.  
Turning to the control variables, I find that the deviation between actual and 
expected ratings, DIFF, is positively associated with the level of future cash flows (p < 
0.01 in both columns 1 and 3), and is negatively associated with the volatility of future 
cash flows (p < 0.1 in column 4). Despite investors’ concerns about biased credit ratings, 
these results are consistent with CRAs’ focus on the long-term credit quality. I also find 
some evidence that residual analyst earnings forecast news, RAF_NEWS, is significantly 
and negatively associated with the volatility of future cash flows (α4 = -0.7993 and p < 
0.05 in column 4).  
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CHAPTER 5 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
Credit Rating Characteristics and the Relevance of Management Earnings 
Guidance  
In this section, I examine whether certain credit rating characteristics moderate 
the association between negative earnings guidance news and future credit rating changes. 
First, I consider the impact of a firm’s current credit rating level because lower ratings are 
known to be less stable and are presumably more sensitive to negative guidance news 
(Standard & Poor’s 2012c). Empirically, I focus on credit rating changes in the current 
and subsequent three quarters of management guidance (i.e., ΔCRq+3), and modify Eq. (1) 
by including CR_LEVEL and the interaction between MF_NEWS and CR_LEVEL in the 
model, where CR_LEVEL is the credit rating level at the beginning of the guidance 
quarter.25 In the untabulated result, I find a significant and positive main effect of 
MF_NEWS (coefficient = 0.4653, p < 0.01) and a significant and negative interaction 
effect of MF_NEWS and CR_LEVEL (coefficient = -0.1225, p < 0.1) for the downward 
earnings guidance sample. This result suggests downward guidance is more relevant for 
lower credit ratings. 
Next, I examine the impact of negative earnings guidance news on initial versus 
non-initial credit ratings. By initial credit rating, I refer to the first credit rating assigned 
to a firm by a CRA. Such a rating is usually determined by a comprehensive rating 
process, in which credit analysts conduct a thorough credit risk evaluation and frequently 
meet with the issuer’s management to obtain additional information. As a result, initial 
                                                 
25 Specifically, I code the AAA and AA rating categories as 5, the A rating category as 4, …, and the B 
rating category as 1.  
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credit ratings are likely to be less sensitive to the subsequent short-term earnings 
guidance news. To test this, I focus on ΔCRq+3 and modify Eq. (1) by including 
INITIAL_CR and the interaction between MF_NEWS and INITIAL_CR in the model. In 
the untabulated result, I find a significant and positive main effect of MF_NEWS 
(coefficient = 0.1846, p < 0.01) but an insignificant interaction effect of MF_NEWS and 
INITIAL_CR (coefficient = -0.0956, p > 0.1) for the downward guidance sample. 
However, the result of the F-test indicates that the sum of the above coefficients is not 
significantly different from zero, providing some evidence that downward guidance is 
less relevant for initial credit ratings. 
Prior Guidance Characteristics and the Relevance of Management Earnings 
Guidance  
In this section, I examine whether managers’ prior guidance behavior affects 
CRAs’ incorporation of negative earnings guidance news into credit ratings. I first 
consider the impact of managers’ prior guidance frequency. On one hand, greater 
guidance frequency implies greater guidance credibility due to more transparent 
disclosure policies; on the other hand, greater guidance frequency suggests lower 
relevance of management guidance due to the richer information environment and thus a 
greater reliability of alternative information sources. As such, whether prior guidance 
frequency moderates the association between negative earnings guidance news and future 
credit rating changes is an empirical question. Empirically, I again focus on ΔCRq+3 and 
modify Eq. (1) by including PRIOR_FREQ and the interaction between MF_NEWS and 
PRIOR_FREQ in the model, where PRIOR_FREQ is the number of quarters that a firm 
issued any form of management guidance in the prior year. In the untabulated result, I 
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find a significant and positive main effect of MF_NEWS (coefficient = 0.4224, p < 0.01) 
and a significant and negative interaction effect of MF_NEWS and PRIOR_FREQ 
(coefficient = -0.0767, p < 0.1) for the downward guidance sample. This result suggests 
occasional downward guidance is relatively more informative about future credit rating 
changes. 
Next, I examine whether CRAs’ incorporation of negative earnings guidance 
news depends on a firm’s prior guidance accuracy, a proxy for the current guidance 
quality. Focusing on ΔCRq+3, I modify Eq. (1) by including PRIOR_ACCY and the 
interaction between MF_NEWS and PRIOR_ACCY in the model, where PRIOR_ACCY is 
the decile ranking of negative one times the mean of absolute price-deflated management 
forecast errors in the prior year, scaled to range from 0 to 1.26 In the untabulated result, I 
find an insignificant main effect of MF_NEWS (coefficient = 0.1152, p > 0.1) and a 
significant and positive interaction effect of MF_NEWS and PRIOR_ACCY (coefficient = 
1.2006, p < 0.05) for the downward guidance sample. This result suggests ex-ante more 
accurate downward guidance is more informative about future credit rating changes. 
Relevance of Management Earnings Guidance during the Recent Credit Crisis  
Prior literature documents that management earnings guidance are perceived to be 
more relevant by the CDS market investors during the recent credit crisis period relative 
to the pre-crisis period (Shivakumar et al. 2011). Observing the unusually high market-
wide credit risk during the crisis period, CRAs may as well consider the voluntarily 
earnings disclosure a more relevant information source of a firm’s credit risk. To test this, 
I focus on ΔCRq+3 as before and modify Eq. (1) by including CRISIS and the interaction 
                                                 
26 The result is qualitatively similar when the untransformed measure is used. 
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between MF_NEWS and CRISIS in the model, where CRISIS is an indicator variable set 
equal to one if the management earnings guidance is issued during July 2007 and June 
2009, and zero otherwise. In the untabulated result, I find a significant and positive main 
effect of MF_NEWS (coefficient = 0.1378, p < 0.01) as well as a significant interaction 
effect of MF_NEWS and CRISIS (coefficient = 0.3944, p < 0.05) for the downward 
guidance sample. This result suggests that downward earnings guidance is even more 
relevant for credit ratings when the market-wide credit risk is high. 
Annual Earnings Guidance News and Future Credit Rating Changes  
Given that corporate credit ratings are designed to capture long-term credit 
quality, natural questions are whether managers’ annual earnings guidance is also 
informative and whether annual earnings guidance is more informative than quarterly 
earnings guidance about future credit rating changes. While the longer forecast horizon of 
annual earnings guidance may support these conjectures, other characteristics of annual 
earnings guidance are likely to work against them. For instance, prior literature shows 
that managers’ annual guidance is less accurate than their quarterly guidance (Hirst et al. 
2008); in addition, relative to quarterly guidance for which there is nearer-term 
accountability, the longer forecast horizon of annual guidance provides greater room for 
managers’ strategic forecasting behavior.  
To investigate these questions, I repeat the main analyses with the annual earnings 
guidance data. As with quarterly guidance, I find that downward annual guidance news is 
significantly and positively associated with both the occurrence and speed of credit rating 
downgrades in the year following the guidance issuance (untabulated). In the cross-
sectional analyses, I find that downward annual guidance news is even more informative 
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when a firm’s current rating is too optimistic relative to the expected rating and when its 
financial reporting has become less transparent. Nevertheless, relative to the results of 
quarterly guidance, the statistical significance of the MF_NEWS main effect is weaker in 
some cases, suggesting that quarterly guidance on average may be more informative than 
annual guidance about future rating downgrades.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
While CRAs claim to use both forward-looking and historical information in 
evaluating a firm’s credit risk, the role of forward-looking information in their rating 
decisions is not well understood. In this study, I examine the association between 
management earnings guidance news and future credit rating changes. I find that negative 
guidance news is associated with both the likelihood and timeliness of future credit rating 
downgrades, especially when (i) a firm’s actual rating is more optimistic than the 
expected rating, (ii) such a rating deviation has occurred relatively recently, and (iii) the 
relevance or reliability of alternative information sources is lower. In addition, the 
association between earnings guidance news and credit rating changes is moderated by 
several credit rating and prior guidance characteristics, as well as by market-wide credit 
risk. Finally, I document that negative guidance news is associated with lower future cash 
flows and a higher volatility of future cash flows.  
The findings of this study make several contributions to the literature. First, I 
provide systematic evidence consistent with CRAs incorporating downward earnings 
guidance into their rating decisions. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to 
document the association between voluntarily disclosed forward-looking information and 
future CRA actions. Second, these findings have implications for practitioners, especially 
credit rating users. In particular, credit rating users may use downward guidance to better 
predict future credit rating downgrades; in this regard, the results of the cross-sectional 
analyses would be especially useful. Finally, the findings suggest that managers’ 
downward guidance may have negative credit rating consequences. Therefore, when 
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considering using downward guidance to manage market expectation or litigation risk, 
managers should also take into account the potential credit rating impact of their 
voluntary bad news disclosures.  
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APPENDIX A  
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS  
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CRq-1  S&P’s long-term issuer credit rating measured at the beginning of 
management earnings guidance quarter, where AAA is coded as 16, 
AA+ is coded as 15, …, and B- is coded as 1. 
ΔCRq+τ  Change in credit rating over quarters [q, q+τ], τ = 0, 1, 2, or 3, 
where a positive (negative) change indicates credit rating upgrade 
(downgrade).  
Month_ΔCR  Either Month_DG or Month_UG, where Month_DG is the number 
of months between management earnings guidance date and next 
credit rating downgrade, and Month_UG is the number of months 
between management earnings guidance date and next credit rating 
upgrade. 
MF_NEWS Management earnings guidance news, measured as management 
earnings guidance minus prior analyst consensus for the quarter, 
scaled by beginning stock price of the previous quarter. Prior analyst 
consensus is measured as the mean of one-quarter ahead analyst 
earnings forecasts issued during [-30,-2] of management guidance; 
if missing, prior analyst consensus is replaced by the conditional 
earnings expectation for the quarter (Rogers and Van Buskirk 2013). 
DIFF The difference between a firm’s actual credit rating and expected 
credit rating at the end of the quarter (i.e., current rating - expected 
rating), where a positive (negative) difference suggests that actual 
rating is more optimistic (pessimistic) than the expected rating. See 
Appendix B for details about the estimation of expected ratings. 
RAF_NEWS Analyst earnings forecast news orthogonal to management earnings 
guidance news, measured as the residual term from estimating 
Equation (C.1). See Appendix C for details about the estimation of 
this variable.  
NANALYST Analyst coverage, measured as the natural log of the number of 
analysts following the firm during the quarter. 
ROA Return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets at the end of the quarter. 
LEV Financial leverage, measured as long-term debt plus short-term debt, 
divided by total assets at the end of the quarter. 
ICOVER Interest coverage, measured as operating income before depreciation 
divided by interest expense for the quarter. 
STD_ROA Earnings volatility, measured as standard deviation of ROA over 
most recent 16 quarters, requiring at least 8 quarters with data 
available. 
LOSS An indicator variable set to one if income before extraordinary items 
is negative for the quarter, and zero otherwise. 
INTAN Intensity of intangibles, measured as research and development 
expense scaled by total assets at the end of the quarter. 
ΔEQ Equity financing, an indicator variable set to one if change in 
shareholder equity during the quarter is greater than zero, and zero 
otherwise. 
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DV Cash dividend payment, an indicator variable set to one if the firm 
pays cash dividends during the quarter, and zero otherwise. 
ARET Abnormal stock return, measured as market-adjusted buy-and-hold 
abnormal return over the prior fiscal quarter. 
BETA Market beta, measured based on the market model using daily stock 
returns of the prior 4 quarters. 
STD_RET Return volatility, measured as standard deviation of monthly returns 
over the prior 4 quarters. 
BTM Book-to-market ratio, calculated as book value of common equity 
divided by market value of common equity at the end of the quarter. 
MV Firm size, measured as natural log of the market value of common 
equity at the end of the quarter. 
|ABACC|  Absolute value of abnormal accruals, measured as the residual term 
from estimating the following cross-sectional Jones model for each 
2-digit SIC industry and quarter group, requiring at least 10 
observations for each group: TACCi,q/TAi,q-1 = α0 · (1/TAi,q-1) + α1 · 
(PPEi,q/TAi,q-1) + α2 · (ΔREVi,q/TAi,q-1), where TACC = total accruals, 
measured as income before extraordinary items minus operating 
cash flows, TA = total assets, PPE = gross property, plant, and 
equipment, and ΔREV = change in sales revenue. 
TRANSP Financial reporting transparency, measured as negative one times 
the squared residual from estimating the following cross-sectional 
regression for each 2-digit SIC industry and quarter group, requiring 
at least 10 observations for each group: ARETi,q = α0 + α1 · 
(IBi,q/MVi,q-1) + α2 · (LOSSi,q) + α3 · (LOSSi,q) * (IBi,q/MVi,q-1) + α4 · 
Δ(IBi,q/MVi,q-1), where ARET = the market adjusted return over the 
fiscal quarter, IB = income before extraordinary items, MV = market 
value of equity, LOSS = an indicator set to one if IB is negative, and 
zero otherwise (Gu 2007).  
IG+ An indicator set equal to one if the firm’s actual credit rating is 
investment grade while the expected credit rating is non-investment 
grade (i.e., current rating is more optimistic than the expected rating 
and the two ratings straddle the investment grade cutoff), and zero 
otherwise.  
IG- An indicator set equal to one if the firm’s current credit rating is 
non-investment grade while the expected credit rating is investment 
grade (i.e., current rating is more pessimistic than the expected 
rating and the two ratings straddle the investment grade cutoff), and 
zero otherwise.  
AVG_CFO Level of future cash flows, measured as the mean of operating cash 
flows scaled by beginning total assets over quarters [q, q+3]. 
STD_CFO Volatility of future cash flows, measured as |standard deviation of 
operating cash flows/mean of operating cash flows| over quarters  
[q, q+3], where operating cash flows are scaled by beginning total 
assets. 
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APPENDIX B  
ESTIMATING EXPECTED CREDIT RATINGS 
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CRi,q  = α0 + α1 · NANALYSTi,q + α2 · ROAi,q + α3 · LEVi,q + α4 · ICOVERi,q  
    + α5 · STD_ROAi,q + α6 · LOSSi,q + α7 · INTANi,q + α8 · ΔEQi,q + α9 · DVi,q  
    + α10 · PRICEi,q + α11 · BETAi,q + α12 · STD_RETi,q + α13 · BTMi,q  
    + α14 · MVi,q + α15 · |ABACCi,q| + α16 · TRANSPi,q + Industry FE  
    + Quarter FE + εi,q 
 
 
 
(B.1) 
Dep. Var. =  CR  
 Pred. Sign Coeff. z-stat 
NANALYST + 0.0210 1.63 
ROA + 1.8634 0.61 
LEV - -3.6665*** -8.30 
ICOVER + -0.0002 -0.40 
STD_ROA - -3.8878** -2.40 
LOSS - -1.6688*** -8.22 
INTAN ? -18.7688** -2.11 
ΔEQ ? -0.0907 -0.75 
DV ? 1.3006*** 10.35 
PRICE ? 0.0042 1.21 
BETA - -0.7088*** -6.76 
STD_RET - -5.4827*** -6.04 
BTM ? 0.1970* 1.67 
MV + 1.2482*** 17.19 
|ABACC| - -8.3273*** -2.68 
TRANSP + 1.1039*** 3.74 
Intercept  Included  
Industry & Quarter FE Included  
N  23,710  
Pseudo R2  0.291  
Table notes: This table presents the results from estimating the ordered logit regression of Equation (B.1) 
to generate expected credit ratings. CR = S&P’s long-term issuer credit rating measured at the end of the 
quarter, where AAA is coded as 16, AA+ is coded as 15, …, and B- is coded as 1. NANALYST = the natural 
log of the number of analysts following the firm. ROA = income before extraordinary items divided by total 
assets. LEV = long-term debt plus short-term debt, divided by total assets. ICOVER = operating income 
before depreciation divided by interest expense. STD_ROA = earnings volatility, measured as standard 
deviation of ROA over most recent 16 quarters, requiring at least 8 quarters with data available. LOSS = an 
indicator variable set equal to one if income before extraordinary items is negative for the quarter, and zero 
otherwise. INTAN = intensity of intangibles, measured as research and development expense scaled by total 
assets. ΔEQ = an indicator variable set equal to one if change in shareholder equity during the quarter is 
greater than zero, and zero otherwise. DV = an indicator variable set equal to one if the firm pays cash 
dividends during the quarter, and zero otherwise. PRICE = average monthly closing stock price per share 
over the prior four quarters. BETA = market beta, measured based on the market model using daily stock 
returns of the prior four quarters. STD_RET = standard deviation of monthly returns over the prior four 
quarters. BTM = book value of common equity divided by market value of common equity at the end of the 
quarter. MV = natural log of the market value of common equity at the end of the quarter. |ABACC| = 
absolute value of abnormal accruals, see Appendix A for detailed definition. TRANSP = financial reporting 
transparency, see Appendix A for detailed definition. All accounting-based variables as well as the number 
of analysts following are measured as the mean of the most recent four quarters. z-statistics are based on 
standard errors clustered by firm and by quarter. *, **, ***, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
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APPENDIX C  
ESTIMATING RESIDUAL ANALYST FORECAST NEWS 
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AF_NEWSi,q  = α0 + α1 · MF_NEWSi,q + α2 · MF_NEWSi,q * DOWNi,q  
+ α3 · MF_NEWSi,q * ACCURACYi,q + α4 · MF_NEWSi,q * AGREEi,q  
+ α5 · MF_NEWSi,q * HORIZONi,q + α6 · MF_NEWSi,q * RANGEi,q  
+ α7 · MF_NEWSi,q * NANALYSTi,q + Main Effects + Industry FE  
+ Quarter FE + εi,q 
 
 
 
(C.1) 
 
Dep. Var. =  AF_NEWS 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
Coeff.  
(t-stat) 
Intercept  -4.2906*** 
  (-44.79) 
MF_NEWS + 0.0297 
  (0.35) 
MF_NEWS * DOWN + 0.1699*** 
  (3.76) 
MF_NEWS * ACCURACY + 0.7362*** 
  (10.83) 
MF_NEWS * AGREE + 0.1314*** 
  (3.16) 
MF_NEWS * HORIZON + 0.0021 
  (0.14) 
MF_NEWS * RANGE - -0.0607 
  (-1.63) 
MF_NEWS * NANALYST ? -0.0174 
  (-0.89) 
Main Effects   Included 
Industry & Quarter FE  Included 
N  3,570 
Adj. R2  0.530 
Table notes: This table presents the results from estimating the OLS regression of Equation (C.1). 
AF_NEWS = updated consensus mean analyst forecast minus the pre-existing consensus mean analyst 
forecast for the quarter, scaled by stock price of the previous quarter. MF_NEWS = management earnings 
forecast minus the pre-existing consensus mean analyst forecast for the quarter, scaled by stock price of the 
previous quarter. DOWN = an indicator variable set equal to one if the management earnings forecast falls 
below the pre-existing consensus mean analyst forecast for the quarter (i.e., MF_NEWS < 0), and zero 
otherwise. ACCURACY = decile ranking of negative one times the absolute value of price-deflated 
management earnings forecast error, scaled to range from 0 to 1. AGREE = an indicator variable set equal 
to one if the three-day cumulative abnormal (market-adjusted) returns surrounding the management 
earnings forecast has the same sign as management earnings forecasts news, and zero otherwise. HORIZON 
= the natural log of the number of days between the issuance of management earnings forecast and the 
earnings announcement date for the quarter. RANGE = an indicator variable set equal to one if the 
management earnings forecast is in the form of range forecast, and zero otherwise. NANALYST = the 
natural log of the number of analysts following the firm during the quarter. t-statistics are based on standard 
errors clustered by firm and by quarter. *, **, ***, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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APPENDIX D  
FIGURE AND TABLES 
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Figure 1 
Management Earnings Guidance News Prior to Credit Rating Changes 
 
 
 
Figure notes: This figure shows the average management earnings guidance news (as percentage of stock 
price) in each of the four quarters leading up to a credit rating upgrade/downgrade, which occurs at the end 
of quarter q. Management earnings guidance news is defined as management earnings forecast minus prior 
analyst consensus for the quarter, scaled by stock price. In order to track management earnings guidance 
news from the same firms over time, the management earnings forecasts here are from a sample of firms 
who had issued earnings forecast for all four quarters. Nevertheless, similar patterns can be observed if 
such a restriction is removed. 
 
  
q-3 q-2 q-1 q
Upgraded firms 0.1371 0.1693 0.1723 0.0678
Downgraded firms -0.1057 -0.1267 -0.3652 -0.1128
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
Panel A: Sample selection 
Sample Selection Criteria 
Number of 
Forecasts 
Number of 
Firms 
First Call quarterly management earnings guidance, 1995–2010. 58,559 6,147 
Retain: Earnings guidance with available Compustat data. 48,057 4,334 
Retain: Earnings guidance issued between prior actual earnings 
announcement date and current fiscal quarter-end. 
38,064 3,564 
Retain: First earnings guidance of fiscal quarter. 30,732 3,564 
Retain: Point and range earnings guidance. 26,373 2,971 
Retain: Firms not in financial or regulated industries. 24,638 2,594 
Retain: Firms with S&P long-term issuer’s credit ratings at the 
beginning of management guidance quarter. 
8,820 798 
Retain: Earnings guidance with available Compustat, CRSP, and 
I/B/E/S data to calculate management guidance news. 
5,489 669 
Retain: Earnings guidance with available Compustat, CRSP, and 
I/B/E/S data to calculate control variables. 
3,570 475 
Retain: Earnings guidance without credit rating change between 
prior fiscal quarter-end and management guidance issuance. 
3,539 473 
Primary Sample       3,539 473 
Panel B: Sample distribution 
Calendar Year Number of Forecasts Percent 
1995 18 0.51% 
1996 26 0.73% 
1997 23 0.65% 
1998 65 1.84% 
1999 78 2.20% 
2000 77 2.18% 
2001 239 6.75% 
2002 312 8.82% 
2003 394 11.13% 
2004 384 10.85% 
2005 369 10.43% 
2006 351 9.92% 
2007 312 8.82% 
2008 305 8.62% 
2009 296 8.36% 
2010 290 8.19% 
Total 3,539 100% 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Stdev Q1 Median Q3 
CRq-1 3,539 7.8135 3.0681 5.0000 8.0000 10.0000 
ΔCRq 3,518 -0.0014 0.2563 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ΔCRq+1 3,495 -0.0157 0.3939 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ΔCRq+2 3,459 -0.0312 0.5363 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ΔCRq+3 3,433 -0.0507 0.6321 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MF_NEWS 3,539 0.0564 1.1477 -0.0903 0.0263 0.3068 
DIFF 3,539 0.1435 1.5273 -1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
RAF_NEWS 3,539 0.0057 0.2719 -0.0805 0.0003 0.0819 
ΔNANALYST 3,539 0.0931 0.4515 -0.1542 0.0572 0.3102 
ΔROA 3,539 -0.0002 0.0325 -0.0049 0.0004 0.0047 
ΔLEV 3,539 -0.0032 0.0745 -0.0398 -0.0111 0.0215 
ΔICOVER 3,539 0.4773 72.0187 -1.7800 0.4660 2.9436 
ΔSTD_ROA 3,539 -0.0001 0.0107 -0.0012 -0.0001 0.0009 
ΔLOSS 3,539 -0.0054 0.3433 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ΔINTAN 3,539 -0.0001 0.0051 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ΔΔEQ 3,539 0.0181 0.3570 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ΔDV 3,539 0.0141 0.2148 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ARET 3,539 0.0199 0.2018 -0.0959 0.0076 0.1152 
ΔBETA 3,539 0.0306 0.3458 -0.1603 0.0308 0.2331 
ΔSTD_RET 3,539 -0.0028 0.0522 -0.0276 -0.0036 0.0194 
ΔBTM 3,539 0.0209 0.2808 -0.0577 0.0112 0.0874 
ΔMV 3,539 0.0395 0.4354 -0.1775 0.0580 0.2814 
Δ|ABACC| 3,539 -0.0016 0.0271 -0.0107 -0.0006 0.0091 
ΔTRANSP 3,539 0.0041 0.1502 -0.0189 0.0002 0.0210 
IG+ 3,539 0.0534 0.2249 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
IG- 3,539 0.0757 0.2646 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
AVG_CFO[q,q+3] 3,454 0.0295 0.0167 0.0196 0.0284 0.0385 
STD_CFO[q,q+3] 3,444 0.8790 2.2601 0.3194 0.5473 1.0711 
Table notes: There are a maximum of 3,539 firm-quarter observations from 1995-2010. Some variables 
have fewer observations due to missing data. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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Table 4 
Profile (Univariate) Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ΔCRq+3 < 0 
(n = 360) 
ΔCRq+3 = 0 
(n = 2,748) 
ΔCRq+3 > 0 
(n = 325) 
MF_NEWSq -0.2117*** 0.0946*** 0.1403** 
 (-3.02) (4.59) (2.25) 
DIFFq-1 0.6167*** 0.2165*** -0.9015*** 
 (7.28) (7.67) (-11.74) 
RAF_NEWSq -0.0240 0.0028 0.0631*** 
 (-1.15) (0.60) (4.37) 
ΔNANALYSTq-1 0.0890*** 0.0943*** 0.1172*** 
 (4.01) (10.80) (5.06) 
ΔROAq-1 -0.0061** -0.0007 0.0095*** 
 (-2.50) (-1.31) (3.72) 
ΔLEVq-1 0.0178*** -0.0031** -0.0340*** 
 (4.27) (-2.34) (-7.95) 
ΔICOVERq-1 -7.9439** 0.7806 8.5954** 
 (-2.46) (0.55) (2.24) 
ΔSTD_ROAq-1 0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0007 
 (1.13) (-1.26) (-1.29) 
ΔLOSSq-1 0.0667*** -0.0076 -0.0615*** 
 (3.14) (-1.21) (-3.21) 
ΔINTANq-1 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (-0.33) (-1.27) (-0.31) 
ΔΔEQq-1 -0.0444** 0.0266*** 0.0185 
 (-2.32) (3.90) (1.03) 
ΔDVq-1 0.0222* 0.0135*** 0.0123 
 (1.89) (3.43) (0.82) 
ARETq-1 -0.0590*** 0.0229*** 0.0825*** 
 (-5.73) (6.15) (6.82) 
ΔBETAq-1 0.0077 0.0312*** 0.0373* 
 (0.43) (4.89) (1.67) 
ΔSTD_RETq-1 0.0058** -0.0032*** -0.0090*** 
 (2.27) (-3.33) (-2.83) 
ΔBTMq-1 0.1366*** 0.0131*** -0.0588*** 
 (7.81) (2.69) (-3.09) 
ΔMVq-1 -0.2018*** 0.0516*** 0.2359*** 
 (-8.03) (6.62) (9.62) 
Δ|ABACCq-1| -0.0030* -0.0013** -0.0010 
 (-1.72) (-2.56) (-0.70) 
ΔTRANSPq-1 -0.0126* 0.0079*** -0.0071 
 (-1.67) (2.87) (-0.71) 
Table notes: This table shows the means of the determinants of credit rating changes, along with t-statistics 
from testing whether the means are statistically different from zero, for three groups of firms: (1) firms 
whose credit ratings are downgraded (i.e., ΔCRq+3 < 0), (2) firms whose credit ratings do not change (i.e., 
ΔCRq+3 = 0), and (3) firms whose credit ratings are upgraded (i.e., ΔCRq+3 > 0) during the current and 
subsequent three quarters of management guidance issuance. Δ = change from quarter q-5 to quarter q-1. *, 
**, ***, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
59 
 
Table 5 
Management Earnings Guidance News and Future Credit Rating Changes 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var. =   ΔCRq ΔCRq+1 ΔCRq+2 ΔCRq+3 Month_DG Month_UG 
 
Pred 
Sign 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
MF_NEWS + 0.0058 0.1203** 0.1355*** 0.1703*** 0.0288** 0.0332 
  (0.07) (2.23) (2.61) (3.38) (2.13) (1.36) 
DIFF - -0.4819*** -0.4546*** -0.4106*** -0.3986*** -0.0362** 0.0634*** 
  (-6.59) (-7.63) (-8.01) (-7.79) (-2.01) (2.88) 
RAF_NEWS + 0.3174 0.6377** 0.6801*** 0.5760** 0.0936 -0.0429 
  (0.74) (2.24) (2.61) (2.40) (1.57) (-0.42) 
ΔNANALYST + 0.0838 0.0764 0.1055 0.1267 0.0309 -0.0020 
  (0.47) (0.65) (1.11) (1.48) (0.80) (-0.04) 
ΔROA + 1.7971 2.8177 2.9961 2.6451 -1.8150 -1.5084* 
  (0.50) (0.95) (1.22) (1.19) (-1.51) (-1.87) 
ΔLEV - -1.6443 -3.4329*** -2.7425*** -3.7784*** 0.1774 0.9316*** 
  (-1.26) (-3.56) (-3.12) (-5.17) (0.59) (2.68) 
ΔICOVER + 0.0019 0.0009 0.0008 0.0011* 0.0005 -0.0006 
  (1.54) (1.13) (0.98) (1.95) (1.46) (-0.96) 
ΔSTD_ROA - -4.7632 -6.7434 -1.8883 -2.0278 -7.6789*** 2.7677 
  (-0.74) (-1.07) (-0.32) (-0.37) (-2.92) (1.02) 
ΔLOSS - -0.4127 -0.0748 -0.0117 -0.1542 -0.0655 -0.1832* 
  (-1.11) (-0.29) (-0.05) (-0.83) (-0.77) (-1.87) 
ΔINTAN ? 39.9600* 14.4261 -0.1826 4.0949 2.0953 -3.5206 
  (1.89) (1.11) (-0.01) (0.30) (0.47) (-0.77) 
ΔΔEQ ? 0.0435 0.1229 0.2128 0.1636 0.0663 0.0222 
  (0.11) (0.62) (1.30) (1.07) (0.83) (0.27) 
ΔDV ? -0.1261 -0.0952 -0.4312 -0.5214* -0.1385 -0.1179 
  (-0.39) (-0.35) (-1.58) (-1.75) (-1.12) (-0.96) 
ARET + 1.8972*** 1.0398*** 1.2188*** 1.1141*** 0.1895 0.0428 
  (3.42) (2.61) (3.89) (3.94) (1.20) (0.31) 
ΔBETA - 0.2054 0.2196 0.1316 0.0601 -0.1049 -0.1740** 
  (0.78) (1.07) (0.65) (0.32) (-1.33) (-2.51) 
ΔSTD_RET - -0.8118 0.5892 0.4999 0.3479 -0.7167 0.1116 
  (-0.32) (0.37) (0.38) (0.26) (-1.23) (0.21) 
ΔBTM ? 0.0537 -0.1836 -0.2573 -0.3209 -0.1614 0.1216 
  (0.12) (-0.79) (-0.97) (-1.35) (-1.45) (1.13) 
ΔMV + 0.6559* 0.5780** 0.6324** 0.7177*** -0.0345 -0.0999 
  (1.81) (2.14) (2.40) (3.04) (-0.39) (-1.20) 
Δ|ABACC| - -5.4686** -0.2924 0.2837 1.0985 -0.5076 0.8121 
  (-2.20) (-0.14) (0.14) (0.60) (-0.60) (0.78) 
ΔTRANSP + 1.0700** 0.4746 0.3587 0.4371 -0.2080 0.1562 
  (2.32) (1.37) (1.30) (1.36) (-1.39) (1.04) 
Intercept  Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry & Quarter FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N  3,518 3,495 3,459 3,433 683 568 
Pseudo R2  0.209 0.162 0.150 0.152 0.102 0.138 
Table notes: This table presents the results from estimating Equation (1). ΔCR = change in credit rating 
over quarters [q, q+τ], τ = 0, 1, 2, or 3, where a positive (negative) change indicates credit rating upgrade 
(downgrade). Month_DG = the number of months from earnings guidance to next credit rating downgrade. 
Month_UG = the number of months from earnings guidance to next credit rating upgrade. MF_NEWS = 
management earnings forecast minus prior analyst consensus for the quarter, scaled by stock price of the 
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previous quarter. DIFF = actual rating minus expected rating, where a positive (negative) difference 
suggests that actual rating is more optimistic (pessimistic) than the expected rating based on the estimation 
of Equation (B.1). RAF_NEWS = analyst earnings forecast news orthogonal to management earnings 
guidance news, measured as the residual term from estimating Equation (C.1). NANALYST = the natural log 
of the number of analysts following the firm. ROA = income before extraordinary items divided by total 
assets. LEV = long-term debt plus short-term debt, divided by total assets. ICOVER = operating income 
before depreciation divided by interest expense. STD_ROA = earnings volatility, measured as standard 
deviation of ROA over most recent 16 quarters, requiring at least 8 quarters with data available. LOSS = an 
indicator variable set equal to one if income before extraordinary items is negative for the quarter, and zero 
otherwise. INTAN = intensity of intangibles, measured as research and development expense scaled by total 
assets. ΔEQ = an indicator variable set equal to one if change in shareholder equity during the quarter is 
greater than zero, and zero otherwise. DV = an indicator variable set equal to one if the firm pays cash 
dividends during the quarter, and zero otherwise. ARET = market-adjusted buy-and-hold return over the 
prior fiscal quarter. BETA = market beta, measured based on the market model using daily stock returns of 
the prior four quarters. STD_RET = standard deviation of monthly returns over the prior four quarters. BTM 
= book value of common equity divided by market value of common equity at the end of the quarter. MV = 
natural log of the market value of common equity at the end of the quarter. |ABACC| = absolute value of 
abnormal accruals, see Appendix A for detailed definition. TRANSP = financial reporting transparency, see 
Appendix A for detailed definition. Except for ΔCR, Δ = change from quarter q-5 to quarter q-1. z-statistics 
are based on standard errors clustered by firm and by quarter. *, **, ***, indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Downward versus Upward Earnings Guidance 
Panel A. Downward Guidance (MF_NEWS < 0) Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. Var. =   ΔCRq ΔCRq+1 ΔCRq+2 ΔCRq+3 Month_DG 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
MF_NEWS + 0.0771 0.1075*** 0.1334*** 0.1817*** 0.0375*** 
  (0.76) (4.84) (2.84) (3.03) (2.80) 
DIFF - -0.4654*** -0.4435*** -0.4245*** -0.4252*** -0.0369** 
  (-3.61) (-5.39) (-5.92) (-6.88) (-2.06) 
RAF_NEWS + 0.9318 0.9698*** 0.8193*** 0.6345** 0.0980* 
  (1.49) (3.43) (3.05) (2.01) (1.65) 
ΔNANALYST + 0.3485 0.3121 0.4525*** 0.4233** 0.0294 
  (0.97) (1.40) (2.64) (2.34) (0.77) 
ΔROA + 1.3944 2.6829 1.6220 -0.3150 -1.8214 
  (0.19) (0.61) (0.48) (-0.09) (-1.50) 
ΔLEV - -0.4804 -2.6335* -2.4029* -3.3083*** 0.1746 
  (-0.27) (-1.69) (-1.94) (-2.94) (0.58) 
ΔICOVER + 0.0025 0.0015* 0.0018** 0.0015* 0.0005 
  (1.28) (1.65) (2.18) (1.94) (1.48) 
ΔSTD_ROA - 7.0689 -0.7519 0.1488 -3.7959 -7.5368*** 
  (0.57) (-0.10) (0.02) (-0.48) (-2.87) 
ΔLOSS - 0.0338 0.2254 0.3113 0.0325 -0.0622 
  (0.05) (0.51) (0.88) (0.11) (-0.72) 
ΔINTAN ? 73.0660** 1.7263 -16.7110 -8.8512 2.2946 
  (2.14) (0.06) (-0.67) (-0.39) (0.53) 
ΔΔEQ ? 0.7403 0.4038 0.5847** 0.2305 0.0661 
  (1.32) (1.58) (2.56) (1.14) (0.83) 
ΔDV ? 0.3849 -0.1051 -0.4356 -0.6496 -0.1352 
  (0.57) (-0.21) (-1.05) (-1.61) (-1.08) 
ARET + 2.8312*** 1.3954** 1.6396*** 1.8023*** 0.2078 
  (3.30) (2.44) (2.97) (4.42) (1.34) 
ΔBETA - 0.3407 0.1199 -0.0321 -0.1382 -0.1041 
  (0.72) (0.34) (-0.10) (-0.46) (-1.32) 
ΔSTD_RET - -4.8987 -0.1809 -1.7018 -0.6529 -0.7390 
  (-1.28) (-0.07) (-0.79) (-0.31) (-1.28) 
ΔBTM ? 0.0553 -0.3124 -0.5163 -0.4250 -0.1575 
  (0.09) (-0.73) (-1.15) (-0.93) (-1.40) 
ΔMV + 0.7365 0.4603 0.2405 0.3683 -0.0422 
  (1.52) (1.21) (0.53) (0.92) (-0.48) 
Δ|ABACC| - -4.4379 1.6865 1.8687 1.6394 -0.5252 
  (-0.95) (0.41) (0.53) (0.52) (-0.62) 
ΔTRANSP + 0.7544 0.5018 -0.0786 0.2258 -0.2165 
  (1.02) (0.95) (-0.18) (0.47) (-1.44) 
Intercept  Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry & Quarter FE Included Included Included Included Included 
N  1,478 1,467 1,453 1,440 683 
Pseudo R2  0.315 0.227 0.200 0.125 0.102 
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Table 6 
Downward versus Upward Earnings Guidance 
Panel B. Upward Guidance (MF_NEWS > 0) Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. Var. =   ΔCRq ΔCRq+1 ΔCRq+2 ΔCRq+3 Month_UG 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
MF_NEWS + -0.0551 0.1953 0.1458 0.1879 -0.0178 
  (-0.36) (1.40) (1.09) (1.29) (-0.50) 
DIFF - -0.6259*** -0.4428*** -0.4045*** -0.4377*** 0.0727*** 
  (-5.74) (-6.17) (-6.02) (-5.83) (3.27) 
RAF_NEWS + -0.9988 -0.2366 0.4184 0.6451 -0.0607 
  (-1.21) (-0.41) (0.75) (1.29) (-0.56) 
ΔNANALYST + -0.2039 -0.0490 -0.1490 -0.1402 -0.0041 
  (-0.58) (-0.27) (-1.07) (-1.17) (-0.08) 
ΔROA + 8.2806** 5.2334 7.5094*** 7.6675*** -1.4789* 
  (2.02) (1.22) (2.65) (2.73) (-1.76) 
ΔLEV - -2.8138 -4.4062*** -3.5340*** -4.9890*** 0.9246*** 
  (-1.24) (-3.58) (-3.47) (-5.11) (2.63) 
ΔICOVER + 0.0013 0.0000 -0.0009 0.0004 -0.0006 
  (0.69) (0.02) (-0.89) (0.52) (-0.95) 
ΔSTD_ROA - -14.4783 -9.7276 -2.0631 -3.1274 3.0666 
  (-1.13) (-1.08) (-0.29) (-0.39) (1.12) 
ΔLOSS - -0.6711 -0.2864 -0.3088 -0.2366 -0.1935** 
  (-1.25) (-0.80) (-1.15) (-0.86) (-1.99) 
ΔINTAN ? 12.1154 26.6311 12.4594 12.1640 -3.5096 
  (0.64) (1.61) (0.70) (0.77) (-0.79) 
ΔΔEQ ? -0.4223 -0.0731 -0.1052 0.0924 0.0073 
  (-0.68) (-0.34) (-0.62) (0.55) (0.09) 
ΔDV ? -0.6871 -0.2197 -0.4711 -0.4137 -0.1042 
  (-0.94) (-0.44) (-1.08) (-0.83) (-0.84) 
ARET + 1.7395** 0.7869 0.8078* 0.6215 0.0705 
  (2.01) (1.36) (1.74) (1.30) (0.50) 
ΔBETA - -0.0644 0.2858 0.3146 0.2336 -0.1771** 
  (-0.15) (1.42) (1.52) (1.08) (-2.57) 
ΔSTD_RET - 2.4723 2.2414 2.7002 0.7928 -0.0053 
  (0.67) (0.96) (1.41) (0.34) (-0.01) 
ΔBTM ? -0.2269 -0.2415 -0.1494 -0.3536 0.1014 
  (-0.43) (-0.66) (-0.44) (-1.15) (0.99) 
ΔMV + 0.4095 0.4200 0.6970** 0.8962*** -0.0938 
  (0.73) (1.22) (2.20) (2.89) (-1.15) 
Δ|ABACC| - -5.1385 1.3078 1.9728 1.6431 0.7893 
  (-1.13) (0.42) (0.64) (0.56) (0.76) 
ΔTRANSP + 0.3808 -0.1612 0.0048 0.3031 0.1517 
  (0.54) (-0.21) (0.01) (0.46) (0.97) 
Intercept  Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry & Quarter FE Included Included Included Included Included 
N  1,959 1,947 1,927 1,914 568 
Pseudo R2  0.308 0.154 0.141 0.142 0.137 
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Table notes: This table presents the results from estimating Equation (1) separately for the downward and 
upward guidance samples. ΔCR = change in credit rating over quarters [q, q+τ], τ = 0, 1, 2, or 3, where a 
positive (negative) change indicates credit rating upgrade (downgrade). DG_Month = the number of 
months from earnings guidance to next credit rating downgrade. UG_Month = the number of months from 
earnings guidance to next credit rating upgrade. MF_NEWS = management earnings forecast minus prior 
analyst consensus for the quarter, scaled by stock price of the previous quarter. DIFF = actual rating minus 
expected rating, where a positive (negative) difference suggests that actual rating is more optimistic 
(pessimistic) than the expected rating based on the estimation of Equation (B.1). RAF_NEWS = analyst 
earnings forecast news orthogonal to management earnings guidance news, measured as the residual term 
from estimating Equation (C.1). NANALYST = the natural log of the number of analysts following the firm. 
ROA = income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. LEV = long-term debt plus short-term 
debt, divided by total assets. ICOVER = operating income before depreciation divided by interest expense. 
STD_ROA = earnings volatility, measured as standard deviation of ROA over most recent 16 quarters, 
requiring at least 8 quarters with data available. LOSS = an indicator variable set equal to one if income 
before extraordinary items is negative for the quarter, and zero otherwise. INTAN = intensity of intangibles, 
measured as research and development expense scaled by total assets. ΔEQ = an indicator variable set equal 
to one if change in shareholder equity during the quarter is greater than zero, and zero otherwise. DV = an 
indicator variable set equal to one if the firm pays cash dividends during the quarter, and zero otherwise. 
ARET = market-adjusted buy-and-hold return over the prior fiscal quarter. BETA = market beta, measured 
based on the market model using daily stock returns of the prior four quarters. STD_RET = standard 
deviation of monthly returns over the prior four quarters. BTM = book value of common equity divided by 
market value of common equity at the end of the quarter. MV = natural log of the market value of common 
equity at the end of the quarter. |ABACC| = absolute value of abnormal accruals, see Appendix A for 
detailed definition. TRANSP = financial reporting transparency, see Appendix A for detailed definition. 
Except for ΔCR, Δ = change from quarter q-5 to quarter q-1. z-statistics are based on standard errors 
clustered by firm and by quarter. *, **, ***, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 7 
Relevance of Management Guidance News Conditional on the Magnitude of  
Deviation between Actual and Expected Ratings 
  MF_NEWS < 0 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. Var. =   ΔCRq ΔCRq+1 ΔCRq+2 ΔCRq+3 Month_DG 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
MF_NEWS + 0.0808 0.0756 0.1263*** 0.1998*** 0.0147 
  (0.98) (1.21) (2.94) (3.36) (1.17) 
DIFF - -0.6281*** -0.4347*** -0.3983*** -0.3820*** -0.0211 
  (-4.60) (-4.79) (-4.84) (-5.54) (-1.04) 
MF_NEWS * DIFF + 0.0162 0.0592** 0.0670** 0.0893*** 0.0598*** 
  (0.29) (2.07) (2.03) (2.60) (4.31) 
IG+ ? 1.9056** 0.3976 0.4874 -0.1084 0.1627* 
  (2.24) (0.73) (0.98) (-0.17) (1.96) 
MF_NEWS * IG+ + 0.0572 0.8893** 1.1010*** -0.6169 0.1439*** 
  (0.27) (1.99) (3.56) (-0.60) (2.93) 
IG- ? -1.0482 -0.2541 -0.0723 0.0318 0.1813* 
  (-1.35) (-0.43) (-0.15) (0.07) (1.91) 
MF_NEWS * IG- ? 0.4801 0.3047 0.1276 0.1340 0.5566*** 
  (1.29) (0.82) (0.41) (0.42) (3.04) 
Controls & Intercept Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry & Quarter FE Included Included Included Included Included 
N  1,478 1,467 1,453 1,440 683 
Pseudo R2 0.332 0.234 0.206 0.196 0.112 
Table notes: This table presents the results from estimating Equation (2) for the downward guidance 
sample. ΔCR = change in credit rating over quarters [q, q+τ], τ = 0, 1, 2, or 3, where a positive (negative) 
change indicates credit rating upgrade (downgrade). DG_Month = the number of months from earnings 
guidance to next credit rating downgrade. MF_NEWS = management earnings forecast minus prior analyst 
consensus for the quarter, scaled by stock price of the previous quarter. DIFF = actual rating minus 
expected rating, where a positive (negative) difference suggests that actual rating is more optimistic 
(pessimistic) than the expected rating based on the estimation of Equation (B.1). IG+ = an indicator set 
equal to one if a firm’s actual credit rating is investment grade while the expected credit rating is non-
investment grade, and zero otherwise. IG- = an indicator set equal to one if a firm’s actual credit rating is 
non-investment grade while the expected credit rating is investment grade, and zero otherwise. z-statistics 
are based on standard errors clustered by firm and by quarter. *, **, ***, indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Relevance of Management Guidance News Conditional on the Persistence of  
Deviation between Actual and Expected Ratings 
  MF_NEWS < 0 
 
 
Full 
Sample 
Exclude  
DIFF >  
5 Years 
Exclude  
DIFF >  
1 Years 
Full 
Sample 
Exclude  
DIFF >  
5 Years 
Exclude  
DIFF >  
1 Years 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var. =   ΔCRq+3 ΔCRq+3 ΔCRq+3 Month_DG Month_DG Month_DG 
 
Pred 
Sign 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
MF_NEWS + 0.1998*** 0.2302*** 0.3526*** 0.0147 0.0240 0.0268 
  (3.36) (3.32) (3.79) (1.17) (1.41) (0.85) 
DIFF - -0.3820*** -0.4121*** -0.5763*** -0.0211 -0.0260 0.0702 
  (-5.54) (-4.08) (-2.87) (-1.04) (-0.95) (1.45) 
MF_NEWS * DIFF + 0.0893*** 0.0967** 0.1996** 0.0598*** 0.0603*** 0.1142*** 
  (2.60) (2.09) (2.02) (4.31) (2.92) (2.80) 
IG+ ? -0.1084 0.3803 -0.6156 0.1627* 0.1499 -0.1198 
  (-0.17) (0.61) (-0.69) (1.96) (1.25) (-0.65) 
MF_NEWS * IG+ + -0.6169 0.0596 -1.6190 0.1439*** 0.1260** 0.0415 
  (-0.60) (0.05) (-1.57) (2.93) (2.43) (0.82) 
IG- ? 0.0318 -0.3077 -1.2748* 0.1813* 0.1940** -0.1520 
  (0.07) (-0.63) (-1.66) (1.91) (2.11) (-0.94) 
MF_NEWS * IG- ? 0.1340 0.0674 -0.3698* 0.5566*** 0.4588** -0.2038 
  (0.42) (0.23) (-1.88) (3.04) (2.48) (-0.53) 
Controls & Intercept Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry & Quarter FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N  1,440 1,259 756 683 557 324 
Pseudo R2  0.196 0.191 0.286 0.112 0.149 0.197 
Table notes: This table presents the results from estimating Equation (2) for the restricted downward 
guidance samples. ΔCR = change in credit rating over quarters [q, q+τ], τ = 0, 1, 2, or 3, where a positive 
(negative) change indicates credit rating upgrade (downgrade). DG_Month = the number of months from 
earnings guidance to next credit rating downgrade. MF_NEWS = management earnings forecast minus 
prior analyst consensus for the quarter, scaled by stock price of the previous quarter. DIFF = actual rating 
minus expected rating based on the estimation of Equation (B.1). IG+ = an indicator set equal to one if a 
firm’s actual credit rating is investment grade while the expected credit rating is non-investment grade, and 
zero otherwise. IG- = an indicator set equal to one if a firm’s actual credit rating is non-investment grade 
while the expected credit rating is investment, and zero otherwise. z-statistics are based on standard errors 
clustered by firm and by quarter. *, **, ***, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 9 
Relevance of Management Guidance News Conditional on the Change in Reliability 
of Alternative Information Sources 
  MF_NEWS < 0 
ΔALT_SRCS =  
(-1) * 
ΔTRANSP 
ΔINTAN 
(-1) * 
ΔNANALYST 
(-1) * 
ΔTRANSP 
ΔINTAN 
(-1) * 
ΔNANALYST 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var. =   ΔCRq+3 ΔCRq+3 ΔCRq+3 Month_DG Month_DG Month_DG 
  
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
Coeff. 
(z-stat) 
MF_NEWS + 0.1711*** 0.1609** 0.1819*** 0.0372*** 0.0334** 0.0368*** 
  (3.15) (2.53) (3.92) (2.84) (2.53) (2.73) 
ΔALT_SRCS ? 0.3984 7.6818 -0.2758 0.7343*** 3.4333 -0.0230 
  (0.76) (0.44) (-1.46) (3.43) (0.92) (-0.57) 
MF_NEWS * ΔALT_SRCS + 0.5156*** 13.9091*** 0.2447** 0.2491*** 1.5040* 0.0203 
  (2.85) (4.65) (2.32) (4.05) (1.87) (0.57) 
DIFF - -0.4213*** -0.4237*** -0.4285*** -0.0346* -0.0366** -0.0369** 
  (-6.86) (-6.90) (-6.90) (-1.94) (-2.05) (-2.06) 
Controls & Intercept  Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry & Quarter FE  Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N  1,440 1,440 1,440 683 683 683 
Pseudo R2  0.208 0.196 0.196 0.106 0.102 0.102 
Table notes: This table presents the results from estimating Equation (3) for the downward guidance 
sample. ΔCR = change in credit rating over quarters [q, q+τ], τ = 0, 1, 2, or 3, where a positive (negative) 
change indicates credit rating upgrade (downgrade). DG_Month = the number of months from earnings 
guidance to next credit rating downgrade. MF_NEWS = management earnings forecast minus prior analyst 
consensus for the quarter, scaled by stock price of the previous quarter. TRANSP = financial reporting 
transparency, see Appendix A for detailed definition. INTAN = intensity of intangibles, measured as 
research and development expense scaled by total assets. NANALYST = the natural log of the number of 
analysts following the firm. DIFF = actual rating minus expected rating, where a positive (negative) 
difference suggests that actual rating is more optimistic (pessimistic) than the expected rating based on the 
estimation of Equation (B.1). Except for ΔCR, Δ = change from quarter q-5 to quarter q-1. z-statistics are 
based on standard errors clustered by firm and by quarter. *, **, ***, indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10 
Management Earnings Guidance News and Future Cash Flows Properties 
 
 MF_NEWS < 0 MF_NEWS > 0 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CFO[q, q+3] =   AVG_CFO STD_CFO AVG_CFO STD_CFO 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
Coeff. 
(t-stat) 
Coeff. 
(t-stat) 
Coeff. 
(t-stat) 
Coeff. 
(t-stat) 
Intercept  -0.0075 0.2460 -0.0261*** -3.9715*** 
  (-1.44) (0.28) (-4.07) (-6.19) 
MF_NEWS +/- 0.0009** -0.0917* 0.0006 0.0403 
  (2.54) (-1.80) (0.98) (0.32) 
CFO[q-4, q-1] + 0.5362*** 0.1263** 0.5481*** -0.0213 
  (13.83) (2.35) (17.12) (-0.36) 
DIFF ? 0.0009*** -0.0336 0.0010*** -0.0789* 
  (2.81) (-0.89) (3.27) (-1.84) 
RAF_NEWS +/- 0.0009 0.3660 0.0017 -0.7993** 
  (0.72) (1.33) (0.80) (-2.35) 
ΔNANALYST  0.0009 0.1010 -0.0001 -0.1290 
  (1.01) (0.85) (-0.15) (-1.30) 
ΔROA  0.0057 -3.1804 0.0225 2.0806 
  (0.37) (-1.55) (1.40) (0.58) 
ΔLEV  0.0005 0.6116 0.0082 -0.7552 
  (0.07) (0.68) (1.47) (-0.80) 
ΔICOVER  0.0000* -0.0003 0.0000*** -0.0000 
  (1.93) (-0.81) (3.00) (-0.05) 
ΔSTD_ROA  -0.0354 -3.7483 0.0544 -3.5951 
  (-0.83) (-0.76) (1.12) (-0.41) 
ΔLOSS  -0.0014 -0.3123 -0.0009 -0.0234 
  (-1.35) (-1.26) (-0.90) (-0.09) 
ΔINTAN  0.0843* -7.7703 0.0051 -14.3829 
  (1.77) (-0.77) (0.08) (-1.21) 
ΔΔEQ  0.0003 -0.1239 -0.0004 0.2270 
  (0.29) (-0.69) (-0.49) (1.60) 
ΔDV  0.0006 0.1463 0.0027 0.0839 
  (0.30) (0.33) (1.41) (0.31) 
ARET  0.0043 -0.0869 0.0026 -0.1904 
  (1.47) (-0.21) (1.36) (-0.55) 
ΔBETA  -0.0004 -0.1835 0.0002 -0.0524 
  (-0.29) (-0.79) (0.12) (-0.23) 
ΔSTD_RET  -0.0156 0.8578 -0.0229*** 1.6515 
  (-1.58) (0.59) (-2.67) (0.88) 
ΔBTM  -0.0010 0.6378 0.0061** -0.0798 
  (-0.50) (1.23) (2.01) (-0.20) 
ΔMV  0.0004 0.2816 0.0057*** -0.0016 
  (0.23) (1.07) (2.81) (-0.01) 
Δ|ABACC|  -0.0156 -2.3321 -0.0227* 0.4479 
  (-0.91) (-0.62) (-1.72) (0.17) 
ΔTRANSP  -0.0018 0.1856 -0.0025 0.0241 
  (-0.51) (0.35) (-0.87) (0.05) 
N  1,489 1,485 1,965 1,959 
Adj. R2  0.405 0.103 0.461 0.064 
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Table notes: This table presents the results from estimating the OLS of Equation (4) separately for the 
downward and upward guidance samples. AVG_CFO[q, q+3] = level of future cash flows, measured as the 
mean of operating cash flows scaled by beginning total assets over quarters [q, q+3]. STD_CFO[q, q+3] = 
volatility of future cash flows, measured as |standard deviation of operating cash flows/mean of operating 
cash flows| over quarters [q, q+3], where operating cash flows are scaled by beginning total assets. 
MF_NEWS = management earnings forecast minus prior analyst consensus for the quarter, scaled by stock 
price of the previous quarter. DIFF = actual rating minus expected rating, where a positive (negative) 
difference suggests that actual rating is more optimistic (pessimistic) than the expected rating based on the 
estimation of Equation (B.1). RAF_NEWS = analyst earnings forecast news orthogonal to management 
earnings guidance news, measured as the residual term from estimating Equation (C.1). NANALYST = the 
natural log of the number of analysts following the firm. ROA = income before extraordinary items divided 
by total assets. LEV = long-term debt plus short-term debt, divided by total assets. ICOVER = operating 
income before depreciation divided by interest expense. STD_ROA = earnings volatility, measured as 
standard deviation of ROA over most recent 16 quarters, requiring at least 8 quarters with data available. 
LOSS = an indicator variable set equal to one if income before extraordinary items is negative for the 
quarter, and zero otherwise. INTAN = intensity of intangibles, measured as research and development 
expense scaled by total assets. ΔEQ = an indicator variable set equal to one if change in shareholder equity 
during the quarter is greater than zero, and zero otherwise. DV = an indicator variable set equal to one if the 
firm pays cash dividends during the quarter, and zero otherwise. ARET = market-adjusted buy-and-hold 
return over the prior fiscal quarter. BETA = market beta, measured based on the market model using daily 
stock returns of the prior four quarters. STD_RET = standard deviation of monthly returns over the prior 
four quarters. BTM = book value of common equity divided by market value of common equity at the end 
of the quarter. MV = natural log of the market value of common equity at the end of the quarter. |ABACC| = 
absolute value of abnormal accruals, see Appendix A for detailed definition. TRANSP = financial reporting 
transparency, see Appendix A for detailed definition. Industry and quarter fixed effects are included. Δ = 
change from quarter q-5 to quarter q-1. t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm and by 
quarter. *, **, ***, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
